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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
TERRY J. STEPHENSON, 
Case No. 20021072CA 
Defendant/Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conditional plea of guilty on three 
counts of securities fraud, a second degree felony, and three 
counts of securities fraud, a third degree felony (R. 946-48). 
This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (e) (2002) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANCARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Is defendant entitled to reversal based solely on the 
claim that his due process rights would have been violated if 
Judge Harding had been using drugs or was impaired by drug use at 
the time he adjudicated defendant's motions to dismiss and 
suppress? 
This claim presents a question of law, reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464, 465-66 (Utah 1991). 
2. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion to 
review Judge Harding's rulings, where all the appellate issues 
arising from those rulings either involve questions of law, 
reviewed without deference to Judge Harding, or have been waived 
due to inadequate briefing? 
This ruling would be analogous to and reviewed on the same 
basis as a motion for new trial. That is, the decision XNis a 
matter of discretion with the trial court and will not be 
reversed absent a clear abuse of that discretion." State v. 
Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985) (citation omitted); accord 
State v. Martin, 1999 UT 72, 5 5, 984 P.2d 975 (citing Crookston 
v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 940 (Utah 1993)). 
3. Does Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-19, which authorizes the 
issuance of administrative subpoenas pursuant to the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act, violate the constitutional protection against 
unreasonable searches and seizures because evidence originally 
obtained in an administrative investigation may eventually be 
used in a criminal prosecution? 
Constitutional questions and matters of statutory 
interpretation are reviewed for correctness, with no deference 
accorded to the trial court. See, e.g., State v. James, 819 P.2d 
781, 796 (Utah 1991)(constitutionality of statute); State v. 
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Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993) (interpretation of 
4. Did the trial court err in adjudicating defendant's 
second motion to dismiss, where defendant agreed on the record 
that the motion was rendered moot by the motion to suppress? 
A trial court's disposition of a motion to dismiss presents 
a question of law, reviewed for correctness. State v. Hamilton, 
2003 UT 22, 517, 70 P.3d 111 (citation omitted). 
5. Should this Court consider claims that defendant has 
inadequately briefed? 
No standard of review applies to this issue. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-19, authorizing investigations of the 
Utah Uniform Securities Act, provides: 
(1) (a) The division in its discretion may 
make any public or private investigation 
within or without this state as it considers 
necessary to determine whether any person has 
violated, is violating, or is about to 
violate any provision of this chapter or any 
rule or order hereunder. 
(b) To aid in the enforcement of this 
chapter or in the prescribing of rules and 
forms hereunder, the division may require or 
permit any person to file a statement in 
writing, under oath or otherwise as to all 
the facts and circumstances concerning the 
matter to be investigated. 
(c) The division may publish information 
concerning any violation of this chapter or 
the violation of any rule or order hereunder. 
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(2) For the purpose of any investigation or 
proceeding under this chapter, the division 
or any employee designated by it may: 
(a) administer oaths and affirmations; 
(b) subpoena witnesses and compel their 
attendance; 
(c) take evidence; and 
(d) require the production of any books, 
papers, correspondence, memoranda, 
agreements, or other documents or 
records relevant or material to the 
investigation. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant and his co-defendant, Grant Mills, were charged 
with 18 counts of securities fraud, 15 counts of communications 
fraud, 9 counts of theft by a fiduciary, 1 count of theft by 
deception, 5 counts of issuing a bad check, 3 counts of offer or 
sale of securities by an unlicensed agent, and 1 count of 
racketeering (R. 1-13) . Following waiver of a preliminary 
hearing, defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss (R. 96-99). 
After a hearing before Judge Lynn Davis, the court denied the 
motion (R. 318-34 or addendum A). Thereafter, the parties agreed 
that further evidence should be adduced, and the court agreed to 
revisit its decision (R. 958: 4). Following a second hearing, 
Judge Davis reaffirmed the denial of defendants' motion to 
dismiss (R. 368-73 or addendum B). 
The court set a jury trial (R. 384-89). Defendants then 
filed a motion to suppress, followed one month later by a second 
motion to dismiss (R. 433-35; 593-94). In December 2001, 
following the offer of a plea bargain that would result in a 
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conditional plea, Judge Ray M. Harding held a hearing on the 
motions. See R. 959. At the outset, Judge Harding ruled that 
the motion to dismiss had been rendered moot by stipulation of 
the parties (R. 959: 7-8). Following argument from the parties 
on the suppression motion, Judge Harding took the matter under 
advisement and, the next month, issued a written ruling denying 
the motion (R. 642-56 or addendum C). Three months later, at 
defendants' request, the court held an additional hearing to 
resolve certain factual disputes (R. 685-95; 960). The court 
ordered that no changes or additions to the previously-entered 
findings would be made as a result of that hearing (R. 846 at 
addendum D). 
In July of 2002, Judge Harding was arrested on drug-related 
charges. Defendants thereafter filed a motion for review and 
reversal of the motions to suppress and dismiss that Judge 
Harding had adjudicated (R. 859-61). Judge Gary Stott denied the 
motion (R. 914-16 or addendum E). 
In October of 2002, defendants entered conditional pleas of 
no contest to three second-degree felonies and three third-degree 
felonies (R. 938-44). The court imposed and stayed concurrent 
prison terms on each of the six felonies (R. 946-48). This 
timely appeal by defendant Stephenson followed (R. 954). 
Subsequently, the court stayed the sentences and issued a 
certificate of probable cause (R. 964-65). 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts are recited in light of the findings and in a 
similar form as those entered by Judge Davis in his ruling 
denying defendants' first motion to dismiss as well as in his 
supplemental ruling, with additional citations to the underlying 
record. See R. 327-33 at addendum A; R. 368-73 at addendum B. 
1. In March of 1995, Mark Griffin, director of the Utah 
Division of Securities, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-19, 
ordered an investigation of defendants to ascertain whether they 
were violating the Utah Uniform Securities Act (R. 155, 330, 958: 
6). Based on that investigation and because the Division did not 
handle prosecutions itself, Griffin referred the case to the Utah 
Attorney General's Office to file a civil complaint on its behalf 
(R. 155, 329, 372-73; 958: 10, 14). 
2. Around March 20, 1997, Douglas Witney, Investigations 
Chief for the Utah County Attorney's Office, received two citizen 
complaints about defendants' securities-related activities. In 
response, Witney opened a case against defendants to investigate 
criminal violations of the Utah Uniform Securities Act (R. 958: 
37-38, 48). 
3. Several weeks later, Witney contacted Michael Hines, 
chief of enforcement for the Utah Division of Securities, to 
discuss the investigation. Hines told Witney that the Division 
of Securities was also working on the case (R. 958: 38). 
Thereafter, investigators from the Division of Securities met to 
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screen the case with the Utah County Attorney's Office. (R. 155, 
958: 38, 41, 50-51, 57) . 
4. The relationship between the Utah Division of Securities 
and the Utah County Attorney's Office, as well as the process of 
referring cases from one to the other, was informal and 
cooperative, unmarked by a paper trail or other formalized 
procedures (R. 372, 958: 8-9, 11-12, 51-52, 55, 59). 
5. On May 15, 1997, the Utah Attorney General filed a civil 
action against defendants on behalf of its client, the Utah 
Division of Securities. The suit charged five violations of the 
Utah Uniform Securities Act and sought, among other things, a 
temporary restraining order and preliminary and permanent 
injunctions (R. 133-52, 329) . 
6. In mid-April of 1998, all issues raised in the civil 
suit were settled pursuant to stipulation of the parties, 
followed by a judgment and permanent injunction (R. 113-18, 123-
26, 127-31, 328) . 
7. On April 10, 1998, the Utah County Attorney filed 52 
securities-related felony charges against defendants in this case 
(R. 1-13, 330-33) . 
8. On August 14, 2000, defendants filed a joint motion to 
dismiss, arguing that the Utah County Attorney's Office lacked 
authority to investigate and prosecute violations of the Utah 
Uniform Securities Act (R. 97-98; 192-99). On February 9, 2001, 
Judge Lynn Davis denied the motion (R. 318-34 at addendum A). 
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9. On September 10, 2001, after a jury trial had been set, 
defendants filed a motion to suppress, in which they asserted 
that Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-19 was facially unconstitutional or 
unconstitutional as applied on multiple grounds, including due 
process, fourth amendment, fifth amendment, separation of powers, 
and equal protection (R. 433-54). 
10. Two weeks later, defendants stipulated to the entry of 
guilty pleas on significantly-reduced charges if they lost the 
suppression motion and any subsequent appeal. The court, 
therefore, struck the trial date (R. 655). 
11. On October 17, 2001, defendants filed a second motion 
to dismiss, arguing that the Utah Division of Securities, which 
was not a party to the criminal action initiated by Utah County 
against defendants, had failed to timely comply with a discovery 
order of the court. Defendants asserted that the Division's 
failure prejudicially compromised their ability to proceed on the 
fact-sensitive suppression motion (R. 547-48, 589-90, 592-94). 
12. In December 2001, Judge Ray M. Harding held a hearing 
on the motions to dismiss and to suppress. 
a. Pursuant to a stipulation by the parties, the court 
orally ruled that the discovery issue on which defendants had 
moved to dismiss was moot (R. 959: 5-8). That is, if defendants 
prevailed on the suppression motion, the State would have 
insufficient evidence on which to proceed, and the case would be 
over. Conversely, if defendants lost on the suppression issue, 
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they had already agreed to enter a conditional guilty plea, thus 
mooting the need for additional facts on the motion to dismiss. 
b. As to the motion to suppress, the court heard 
argument from the parties, took the matter under advisement and, 
in January of 2002, issued a 15-page ruling denying the motion on 
all grounds (R. 642-56 at addendum C). 
13. Three months later, in April 2002, defendants requested 
additional findings of fact to supplement the court's suppression 
ruling (R. 666-75). Defendants argued that the stipulation that 
rendered the motion to dismiss moot fairly included not only an 
agreement that the State could not proceed if defendants 
prevailed on the suppression motion, but also an agreement by the 
State to accept defendants' version of the underlying facts as 
they had recited them in the suppression motion (R. 960: 13). 
The court disagreed: "I can tell you that's not what I meant. 
What you are implying . . . is not what the Court meant nor 
intended. I can tell you that and I want that on the record" 
(Id. at 16). The court ordered that no additional or amended 
facts would be entered (R. 846 at addendum D). 
14. In July of 2002, Judge Harding was arrested on drug-
related charges. The next month, defendants filed a motion for 
review and reversal of the motions to suppress and dismiss that 
Judge Harding had adjudicated (R. 859-61). In mid-September, 
Judge Gary Stott denied the motion (R. 914-16 or addendum E). 
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15. In early October of 2002, defendants filed a petition 
for permission to appeal Judge Stott's interlocutory order. This 
Court denied the motion. See addendum F. 
16. In October of 2002, defendants entered conditional 
guilty pleas and were sentenced by Judge Stott (R. 938-44, 946-
48). Defendant Stephenson then filed this timely appeal (R. 
954) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant first argues that if Judge Ray Harding was using 
drugs or was impaired by drug use at the time he adjudicated 
defendants' motions, then defendant's right to due process would 
necessarily have been violated. In this case, motions to dismiss 
and suppress are at issue. As to the motion to dismiss, 
defendant agreed in open court to the stipulation that rendered 
the motion moot. Where defendant so acted, this Court may 
decline to further review the matter. As to the suppression 
motion, defendant cannot prevail on his generic claim of a due 
process violation unless he can specifically demonstrate actual 
bias in his own case. Defendant has made no claim of such bias 
here. Indeed, he points to nothing in the record that even 
remotely suggests that the judge was impaired in any way. Where 
the record reveals that Judge Harding's later criminal conduct 
did not affect the fundamental fairness of the proceedings here, 
defendant is not entitled to reversal on appeal. 
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Second, defendant asserts in a single page that he is 
entitled to discovery and an evidentiary hearing to determine 
whether Judge Harding was using drugs when he adjudicated the 
motions. Because the argument is inadequately briefed, this 
Court may decline to even consider it. Moreover, on the merits, 
the argument fails because all of the other issues defendant 
raises on appeal are either inadequately briefed and thus waived, 
or they present questions of law, which are reviewed for 
correctness, with no deference accorded to Judge Harding's 
rulings below. Consequently, discovery would serve no purpose. 
Third, defendant argues that section 61-1-19 of the Utah 
Uniform Securities Act violates his right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures. His argument seems to be 
that if any evidence obtained by the Utah Division of Securities 
pursuant to administrative authority is later used by another 
agency in a criminal prosecution, then his Fourth Amendment 
rights are violated and the evidence must be suppressed. 
Defendant's argument fails not only because it is inadequately 
briefed but also because, on the merits, it confuses 
administrative and criminal subpoenas. Administrative agencies 
functioning under statutory authority need not comply with the 
constitutional requirements of a criminal investigation. As to 
suppression of evidence obtained civilly and ultimately used 
criminally, the single case on which defendant relies is wholly 
inapposite. 
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Fourth, defendant argues that the trial court erred in 
dismissing his second motion to dismiss. This argument suffers 
from such inadequate briefing that one can hardly make out its 
substance. In any event, however, defendant may not prevail in a 
challenge to the trial court's disposition of his motion where 
defendant agreed in open court to the unambiguous disposition 
below. 
Finally, all other claims that defendant raises are 
inadequately briefed and, therefore, warrant no further review. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO 
REVERSAL BASED SOLELY ON THE CLAIM 
THAT HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WOULD 
HAVE BEEN VIOLATED IF JUDGE HARDING 
HAD BEEN USING DRUGS WHEN HE 
ADJUDICATED DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS 
The crux of defendant's argument is that he has a due 
process right, guaranteed by both federal and state 
constitutions, to have a drug-free judge adjudicate his case. 
See Br. of Aplt. at 25-27, 36-42. This argument fairly implies 
that defendant would be entitled to reversal if Judge Ray 
Harding, Jr. was using drugs when he decided the motions to 
dismiss and suppress. 
Unquestionably, Judge Harding', conduct is a shock to all. 
It represents a significant blow not only to the integrity of the 
judiciary, but also to Utah's legal community as a whole. 
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Nonetheless, Judge Harding's egregious conduct does not provide 
defendant with a "get out of jail free" card where his legal 
argument is insufficient to entitle him to reversal on appeal. 
First, with respect to the motion to dismiss, defendant's 
claim fails because his counsel stipulated to the mootness of the 
motion in open court. See R. 959: 7-8 at addendum G. The court 
phrased the issue as follows: 
If the State were to stipulate that for . . . 
all purposes relating to the motion to 
suppress, that the granting of the motion to 
suppress would be determinative to the case 
and would prohibit the State from going 
forward, would that be sufficient for you to 
withdraw your motion to dismiss? 
Id. at 7. After discussing the stipulation, the court asked, 
"Then do you accept the stipulation on behalf of -," and counsel 
for defendant interjected, "I do. On behalf of Mr. Stephenson, 
we agree" (Id.). The discussion then culminated in the 
following exchange: 
The Court: 
Counsel for 
Stephenson: 
Counsel for 
Mills: 
The Court: 
Counsel for 
State: 
The Court: 
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[D]o you each agree, then, that the 
motion to dismiss, would you like 
it withdrawn or rendered moot? 
I think it's probably determined 
moot based upon— 
Based on the stipulation. 
Moot based upon the stipulation? 
That's fine. 
All right, that's the stipulation. 
That will now be the order as to 
the motion to dismiss. 
R. 959: 8. Under these circumstances, where defendant actively 
agreed to the stipulation that rendered the motion moot, this 
Court should decline to review the claim that the court erred by 
so disposing of the motion. See State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 
1023 (Utah 1987) (appellate court declines to review issue where 
defense counsel affirmatively acquiesced to ruling below); see 
also State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, 1 54, 70 P.3d 111 (appellate 
court will not review jury instruction where trial counsel 
represented she had no objection to it below). 
Second, with respect to the suppression motion, a generic 
claim that defendant's due process rights would have been 
violated if the judge was using drugs or was impaired by drug use 
when he decided the motion is insufficient, in and of itself, to 
require reversal. 
The "Due Process Clause clearly requires a fair trial in a 
fair tribunal." Bracv v. Gramlev, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997) 
(citations omitted). "Ordinarily, we presume that public 
officials have properly discharged their official duties." Id. 
at 909 (citations omitted). To rebut that presumption and be 
entitled to relief, defendant must demonstrate that the judge was 
"actually biased in [defendant's] own case." Id. (emphasis in 
original). 
In this case, defendant makes no claim of bias on the part 
of Judge Harding, nor does he assert that the judge was mentally 
incompetent at the time he disposed of the motions. Instead, 
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defendant asserts a generalized conjectural claim that if the 
judge was using or impaired by drug use at the time, then his due 
process rights were necessarily violated. For support, he cites 
to Judge Harding's arrest in July of 2003 and his subsequent 
admission of guilt to two counts of drug possession. See Br. of 
Aplt. at 25-26. 
Most jurisdictions have imposed a two-part test to determine 
whether a judge's conduct warrants a reversal. First, defendant 
must prove that there was an error in the form of judicial 
misconduct. Second, this error must work to prejudice defendant 
in his specific case. See People v. Coria, 937 P.2d 386, 391 
(Colo. 1997); State v. Scales, 933 P.2d 737, 740 (Kan. 1997); 
Reed v. Recard, 744 So.2d 13, 16 (La. Ct. App. 1998); Erskine v. 
Baker, 22 S.W.3d 537, 539 (Tex. App. 2000). The burden of 
demonstrating prejudice rests, of course, with the party alleging 
judicial misconduct. State v. Miller, 49 P.3d 458, 462 (Kan. 
2002) . 
Very few cases discuss a judge's use of alcohol or drugs. 
Defendant relies heavily on a Ninth Circuit case in which the 
defendant argued that his right to due process was violated 
because the judge, who admitted addiction and pled guilty to 
possession of marijuana, was using the drug both during trial and 
at the time he sentenced defendant to death. See Br. of Aplt. at 
37-42 (citing Summerlin v. Stewart, 267 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 
2001)). Defendants fail to note, however, that the Ninth Circuit 
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subsequently withdrew the opinion, specifically stating that it 
"may not be cited as precedent" within the circuit. Summerlin v. 
Stewart, 281 F.3d 836 (9th Cir. 2002). Ultimately, the court 
reversed on other grounds and did not reach the merits of the 
drug use issue for which defendants cite the case. See Summerlin 
v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2003). 
In a 1998 New York case, a judge was removed from the bench 
due to alcoholism. Karabinas v. Keane, 1998 WL 107106 (S.D.N.Y. 
March 10, 1998).: Years later, a defendant alleged for the first 
time that the judge's alcoholism had tainted his trial. Id. The 
reviewing court denied defendant's petition for habeas corpus 
relief. Not only did defendant's delay in bringing his claim 
create procedural problems, but also the defendant did "not point 
to a single passage in the 1,118-page transcript which gives any 
support to [the] allegation that the judge was drunk while 
presiding at trial,'" and the record itself '"does not indicate 
that the judge was biased against [the defendant].'" Id. at *2. 
In this case, the State acknowledges that Judge Harding was 
arrested and convicted of two drug charges several months after 
1
 A few cases discuss the use of alcohol or drugs by jury 
members, concluding that alcohol or drug use alone by a juror is 
not enough to entitle a defendant to a new trial. See United 
States v. Taliaferro, 558 F.2d 724, 726 (4th cir. 1977) (although 
court looked with disfavor on practice of allowing jurors to have 
alcoholic beverages during deliberations, the mere fact that they 
were so allowed did not require a new trial); United States v. 
Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985, 997 (3rd Cir. 1980) ("we do not think 
that the smoking of marijuana by one juror and two alternates 
warrants reversal in the instant circumstances.") 
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adjudicating defendant's motions. Defendant, however, is unable 
to point to anything in the record to establish that Judge 
Harding was actually under the influence of drugs at the time he 
adjudicated the motions, much less that his alleged drug use 
affected the fairness of the hearings. Certainly, neither the 
prosecutor nor counsel for either defendant raised any issue 
concerning Judge Harding's behavior, demeanor or decision at the 
time of the relevant hearings. No challenge was made to the 
judge's mental competence. No one suggested he was biased 
against defendants. Further, a review of the videotaped hearing 
on the motion to suppress, the transcript of the hearing on the 
motion to dismiss, and the resultant written opinions reveal 
nothing that would lead anyone to believe that Judge Harding was 
in any way impaired. The determinations he made were legal and 
appropriate based on the evidence, the law, and the arguments of 
the parties. Under such circumstances, where the record reveals 
that Judge Harding's conduct in no way affected the fundamental 
fairness of the proceedings, defendant is not now entitled to 
reversal on appeal. 
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POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR REVIEW AND REVERSAL OF 
JUDGE HARDING'S RULINGS WHERE ANY 
ISSUES PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT ON 
APPEAL PRESENT LEGAL QUESTIONS, 
REVIEWED DE NOVO FOR CORRECTNESS 
Without citing any legal authority, defendant baldly asserts 
in a single page that he is entitled to discovery and an 
evidentiary hearing to determine if Judge Harding was using drugs 
at the time he decided defendant's motions. See Br. of Aplt. at 
42-43. In essence, defendant is seeking reversal of the trial 
court's denial of his motion for review and reversal of Judge 
Harding's rulings in his case. See R. 859-61; R. 914-16 at 
addendum E. 
Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure, requires 
that the argument section of appellant's brief contain "the 
contentions and reasons of the appellant" on each issue, with 
"citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record 
relied on." Of this language, the Utah Supreme Court has 
observed: "Implicitly, rule 24(a) (9) requires not just bald 
citation to authority but development of that authority and 
reasoned analysis based on that authority." State v. Thomas, 961 
P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998). Citation to and development of any 
legal authority is wholly absent from defendant's argument. His 
argument, therefore, is waived. State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 
nn.2-5 (Utah App. 1992) (citing State v. Garza, 820 P.2d 937, 939 
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(Utah App. 1991) and State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 
1984) ) . 
Moreover, apart from the issues related to Judge Harding's 
drug use, all of the issues defendant asserts on appeal present 
questions of law. Specifically, defendant raises multiple 
challenges to the constitutionality or correct application of the 
Utah Uniform Securities Act, one challenge to Judge Harding's 
interpretation of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and one 
challenge to his interpretation of a stipulation fully appearing 
in the record. Defendant concedes that these issues all raise 
questions of law, reviewed for correctness. See Br. of App. at 
2-3. The substantive issues raised on appeal thus hinge on the 
legal correctness of Judge Harding's rulings, not on his mental 
state at the time he issued those rulings. This Court will 
review any of the rulings that are now properly before the Court 
de novo, according no deference to Judge Harding's 
determinations. Thus, granting defendant's motion to investigate 
Judge Harding's drug use would serve no purpose. 
Judge Stott recognized this when he denied defendant's 
motions for review and reversal: 
[T]o permit counsel for the defendants to 
somehow conduct a review or investigation 
into Judge Harding's personal life, or 
physical or mental health status at the time 
that he addressed the issues in question in 
this case, would be nothing more than 
permitting a fishing expedition without any 
reasonable basis to authorize such 
expedition. 
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(R. 915 at addendum E). This ruling is correct. 
In light of the legal nature of defendant's appellate 
challenges, defendant has wholly failed to articulate a 
"reasonable basis" for reversing the trial court's ruling denying 
his motion to investigate Judge Harding's drug use. 
POINT THREE 
SECTION 61-1-19 OF THE UTAH UNIFORM 
SECURITIES ACT DOES NOT VIOLATE 
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM 
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES 
In a bare bones argument, defendant asserts that the trial 
court erred when it declared that Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-19 of the 
Utah Uniform Securities Act did not violate the constitutional 
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. See Br. 
of Aplt. at 43-45. Although defendant has not clearly 
articulated the details or flow of his legal argument, the gist 
of his complaint seems to be that the Utah Division of Securities 
turned evidence over to the Utah County Attorney's Office which 
was not obtained in accordance with the rules governing criminal 
investigations. Consequently, he concludes, all such evidence 
must be suppressed in the criminal case initiated by the Utah 
County Attorney's Office. 
This argument is inadequately briefed and so should not be 
considered on appeal. Defendant's 2^ page argument, which 
purports to address a question of constitutional magnitude, cites 
to only two cases, failing to explain specifically how either of 
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them apply to the instant facts or why they should compel 
analogous results. His argument is "devoid of any 'meaningful 
analysis.'" State v. Marquez, 2002 UT App 127, f 10, 54 P.3d 637 
(citation omitted). The law is well-established that Utah 
appellate courts declines to consider claims where defendant has 
wholly failed to offer any meaningful legal analysis. See, e.g., 
State v. Thomas, 1999 UT 2, f 13, 974 P.2d 269; State v. Jaeger, 
1999 UT 1, 5 31, 973 P.2d 404; see also Utah R. App. P. 
24(a) (9) (articulating briefing requirements). 
Should this Court choose to overlook defendant's failure to 
adequately brief this issue, the claim nevertheless fails on the 
merits. Defendant relies on two Utah cases, In Re Criminal 
Investigation, 754 P.2d 633 (Utah 1998) and Zissi v. State Tax 
Comm'n, 842 P.2d 848 (Utah 1992), to support his argument. He 
contends that because the investigation conducted by the Utah 
Division of Securities did not comply with restrictions to the 
Subpoena Powers Act articulated in In Re Criminal Investigation, 
his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches 
and seizures was violated. See Br. of Aplt. at 44. He also 
asserts that Zissi provides support for the proposition that 
evidence obtained from a civil investigation must be suppressed 
as "fruit of the poisonous tree" in a subsequent criminal 
investigation. Id. at 45. 
The trial court correctly found that these issues lacked 
merit. See R. 650-54 at addendum C. First, defendant confuses 
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administrative subpoenas, such as those used by the Utah Division 
of Securities in this case to obtain documents and testimony 
pursuant to the Utah Uniform Securities Act, with criminal 
subpoenas, such as those discussed in In Re Criminal 
Investigation. 
The Utah Division of Securities, an administrative agency, 
is specifically authorized by statute to conduct investigations 
to determine if persons have violated, are violating, or are 
about to violate any provision of the Utah Uniform Securities 
Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-19(1)(a). The statute authorizes 
the Division, among other things, to issue subpoenas and take 
evidence. See Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-19 (2) (b)& (c) . An individual 
who violates the Act may be subject to criminal penalties, but 
only if nis conduct is "willful," a factor that may not be 
apparent at the beginning of an investigation. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 61-1-21. If the individual lacks criminal intent but has 
nonetheless violated the Act, he will be subject to civil 
penalties. See Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-20. 
In contrast, the Subpoena Powers Act, Utah Code Ann. § 77-
22-1 et seq., authorizes the State's attorneys, only upon good 
cause shown and with approval from the courts, to carry out a 
criminal investigation. Once a criminal investigation is 
approved, the State may then judicially subpoena witnesses and 
take relevant evidence. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-22-2. Upon 
motion of a subpoenaed party, the court must quash any subpoena 
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that does not meet the objective standard of reasonableness 
articulated as the good cause for initially authorizing the 
investigation. See In Re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d at 
643-44. The Subpoena Powers Act, then, applies only to criminal 
investigations, which are specifically subject to judicial 
review. 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the 
distinction between administrative and criminal subpoenas: 
Because judicial power is reluctant if not 
unable to summon evidence until it is shown 
to be relevant to issues in litigation, it 
does not follow that an administrative agency 
charged with seeing that the laws are 
enforced may not have and exercise powers of 
original inquiry. It has a power of 
inquisition, if one chooses to call it that, 
which is not derived from the judicial 
function. It is more analogous to the Grand 
Jury, which does not depend on a case or 
controversy for power to get evidence but can 
investigate merely on suspicion that the law 
is being violated, or even just because it 
wants assurance that it is not. When 
investigative and accusatory duties are 
delegated by statute to an administrative 
body, it, too, may take steps to inform 
itself as to whether there is probable 
violation of the law. 
United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-43 (1950). 
Based on this fundamental distinction, the trial court 
rejected defendant's claim that In re Criminal Investigation 
required an administrative agency functioning under statutory 
authority to comply with the constitutional requirements of a 
criminal investigation. The court thus properly concluded: 
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Statutory language specifically delegates to 
the Division the responsibility to ensure 
compliance with the Securities Act and to 
investigate violations. It cannot perform 
this function without the ability to question 
individuals about tneir compliance with the 
Securities Act. It is neither required by 
the Constitution or by statute, and therefore 
not required by this Court, that the Division 
conduct its investigations under the 
requirements of the criminal laws because of 
the mere possibility that each investigation 
may uncover criminal activity. Therefore, 
though the Division's investigation of the 
Defendants did not comply with the 
requirements of the Subpoena Powers Act and 
In the Matter of a Criminal Investigation, 
such compliance is not required. 
R. 651-52 at addendum C. 
Second, the trial court rejected defendant's claim that all 
evidence provided by the Utah Division of Securities to the Utah 
County Attorney's Office must be suppressed. For this 
proposition, defendant had relied on a case in which the Utah 
Supreme Court held that the Drug Stamp Tax Act, which levied a 
tax on the possession of illegal drugs, was unconstitutional 
because it compelled an individual to give incriminating 
information against himself. See Zissi v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 
842 P.2d 848, 857 (Utah 1992). That is, the very act of 
complying with the law by paying a tax on an illegal activity 
provided proof that the person had engaged in that activity. To 
revive the statute, the court interpreted it to mean that 
evidence gained through compliance with the Act could not be used 
in the chain of evidence in any subsequent drug prosecution. Id. 
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Extrapolating from this reasoning, defendant argues that evidence 
obtained by the Division of Securities during its investigations 
should similarly be excluded from the criminal prosecution. See 
Br. of Aplt. at 45. 
Zissi is inapposite. Possession of controlled substances is 
a crime. Therefore, the very act of complying with the Drug 
Stamp Tax Act exposed individuals to criminal sanctions. In 
contrast, there is nothing illegal per se about engaging in the 
business of offering and selling securities. Compliance with the 
Uniform Utah Securities Act does not expose anyone to criminal 
sanctions. As the trial court noted: 
The Zissi court's concern that the Stamp 
Act's requirements would necessarily link the 
individual to crime led it to conclude that 
compliance with the law could not be used to 
establish criminal conduct. See Zissi, 842 
P.2d at 857. 
R. 650 at addendum C. The same rationale simply does not apply 
here. As with most laws, it is the violation of the law, not 
compliance with it, that constitutes the conduct leading to 
criminal culpability. Consequently, defendant's argument, based 
solely on the authority of Zissi, fails. See Br. of Aplt. at 45. 
-25-
POINT FOUR 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
ADJUDICATING DEFENDANT'S SECOND 
MOTION TO DISMISS, WHERE DEFENDANT 
STIPULATED ON THE RECORD THAT THE 
MOTION WAS MOOT 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his 
second motion to dismiss. See Br. of Aplt. at 50-51. The court, 
however, did not deny the motion; instead, it disposed of the 
motion on the ground of mootness, based on a stipulation to which 
the parties expressly agreed (R. 958: 3-6 or addendum G). The 
controversy at this juncture centers on the substance of the 
stipulation. 
Once again, this Court should decline to consider 
defendant's argument because it is inadequately briefed. 
Defendant's cursory argument of less than two pages contains not 
a single legal citation and is wholly devoid of legal analysis. 
He utterly fails to explain the import of the position he takes 
or what would compel the result he seeks. An issue is 
inadequately briefed when "the overall analysis of the issue is 
so lacking as to shift the burden of research and argument to the 
reviewing court." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 
1998). Such is precisely the case here. This Court should not 
consider the issue. 
Nonetheless, to clarify the facts, defendant entered the 
stipulation at a hearing held on the motions to dismiss and 
suppress. See R. 959: 5-8 at addendum G. At the beginning of 
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the hearing, the court suggested that the motion to dismiss, 
which referenced a discovery issue, had been rendered moot 
because defendant had already agreed to enter a conditional 
guilty plea if he lost on the suppression issue (R. 959: 5 or 
addendum G). In other words, if defendant lost the suppression 
motion, he had already committed himself to plead guilty, thus 
rendering the underlying factual discovery issue referenced in 
the motion to dismiss irrelevant. Conversely, if defendant 
prevailed on the suppression motion, the case would be over 
because the State would not have sufficient evidence on which to 
proceed with the prosecution. In this context, after some 
discussion, the following exchange occurred: 
Court: If the State were to stipulate 
that for purposes - for all 
purposes relating to the 
motion to suppress, that the 
granting of the motion to 
suppress would be 
determinative of the case and 
would prohibit the State from 
going forward, would that be 
sufficient for you to withdraw 
your motion to dismiss? 
Cnsl for 
co-Defendant: Yes, I can stipulate to that. 
Id. at 7 or addendum G. Based on this unambiguous exchange, 
counsel for defendant then also agreed, stating, NV0n behalf of 
Mr. Stephenson, we agree" (Id. at 8). 
At a subsequent hearing, however, defendant argued that his 
understanding of the stipulation was different than what appeared 
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in the record. Defendant argued that the stipulation by which 
the motion to dismiss was rendered moot also included the State's 
agreement to defendant's version of the f^:ts (R. 960: 13). That 
is, defendant wanted to use the facts as he had interpreted them 
as the factual basis for arguing the motion to suppress. If the 
State had stipulated to the facts as defendant construed them, 
then defendant could have prevailed on the suppression motion and 
the case would be over. The State maintained and, more 
significantly, the trial court agreed, that the stipulation did 
not comport with defendant's expansive interpretation, but rather 
encompassed only an agreement that if defendant prevailed on the 
suppression motion, the case would be over. Because defendant 
did not prevail, he now challenges the trial court's 
interpretation of the stipulation as a way to revive the 
discovery issue.2 
2
 Defendant nowhere fully articulates this argument. 
Rather, the State infers this meaning from defendant's cryptic 
brief. See Br. of Aplt. at 50-51. Defendant's argument, such as 
it is, quotes an interchange in which the court tells defense 
counsel that he is mistaken in his interpretation of the 
stipulation, and defense counsel concedes that he may have 
misinterpreted the stipulation but that he is nonetheless "kind 
of lost because I don't know where we are on the facts" (R. 960: 
16-17). Where defendant is "on the facts," however, is perfectly 
clear. He must rely on facts that two judges entered in three 
relevant hearings. See addenda A-C. Again, based on defendant's 
inadequate briefing, this Court should decline to address the 
issue at all. See, e.g., State v. Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305, f 
27, 989 P.2d 503. 
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As to defendant's expansive after-the-fact interpretation of 
the stipulation, the trial court unequivocally stated, "I can 
tell you that's not what I meant. What you are implying . . . is 
not what the Court meant nor intended. I can tell you that and I 
want that on the record" (R. 960: 16). Based on its judgment 
that defendant had improperly interpreted the scope of the 
stipulation, the trial court declined to enter any further 
findings of fact, reaffirming that its suppression decision was 
amply supported by facts previously entered in the case. See 
addenda A-C. 
The trial's ruling court was correct. First, the quoted 
plain language of the stipulation as well as the context in which 
it was generated both support the trial court's determination 
about the scope of the stipulation. Second, the discovery issue 
that defendant is trying to bootstrap into this appeal is not 
properly before this Court. While it was apparently discussed at 
a hearing on September 10, 2001, the transcript of that hearing 
is not part of the appellate record. Absent a proper record, 
this Court presumes the regularity of the proceedings below. 
See, e.g. , State v. Blubaah, 904 P.2d 688, 699 (Utah App. 
1995)(citing Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Utah 1989)). 
For these reasons, defendant's claim fails. 
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POINT FIVE 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REVIEW ANY OF 
DEFENDANT'S REMAINING CLAIMS 
BECAUSE THEY ARE INADEQUATELY 
BRIEFED 
Defendant asserts a variety of claims on appeal that are 
unsupported by any legal authority, legal analysis, or record 
citations. He challenges the constitutionality of section 61-1-
19 of the Utah Uniform Securities Act on a variety of grounds. 
Specifically, defendant argues that the trial court erred when it 
determined that section 61-1-19 did not violate the following 
federal and/or constitutional doctrines: separation of powers; 
the right against self-incrimination; equal protection; and due 
process. See Br. of Aplt. at 46-49. Defendant also asserts that 
the trial court misinterpreted the discovery provisions of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure by permitting evidence gathered by 
the Division of Securities to be used in a criminal case. See 
id. at 46. Finally, he argues that the trial court erred when it 
determined that the Utah Uniform Securities Act did not preclude 
the Utah County Attorney's Office from prosecuting this case. 
See id. at 51-52. 
All of these claims are inadequately briefed and, 
consequently, should not be considered on appeal. See, e.g. 
State v. Lucero, 2002 UT App 135, 1 8, 47 P.3d 107; Marquez, 2002 
UT App 127 at fl 12; s^e also Utah R. App. P. 24(a) (9) 
(articulating components of adequate argument). Each of 
-30-
defendant's inadequate arguments is less than a page; the 
shortest is a bare two paragraphs. See Br. of Aplt. at 46-49. 
In several instances, it is difficult to glean even the faintest 
outline of defendant's substantive argument. See id. at 46-47. 
Defendant's arguments do not explain the law inherent in the few 
cases he cites, nor does he present any reasoned analysis based 
on those cases that would compel analogous results here. See 
Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305 (waiving issue based on rule 24(a) (9) 
requirement of meaningful legal analysis). Rather than 
constructing persuasive legal arguments that would lead 
inexorably to the result he desires, defendant instead merely 
asserts the outcome he would like this Court to reach. 
This Court has stated on numerous occasions that it "is not 
simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the 
burden of argument and research." State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 
450 (Utah 1988) (citation omitted); see also Utah R. App. P. 
24(a)(9). Accordingly, "[w]hen a party fails to offer any 
meaningful analysis regarding a claim, we decline to reach the 
merits." State v. Garner, 2002 UT App 234, SI 12, 52 P.3d 467; 
accord Thomas, 1999 UT 2 at 1 13, Jaeger, 1999 UT 1 at 1 31; 
Price, 827 P.2d at 250. Where defendant has wholly failed to 
carry his burden of providing this Court with any meaningful 
legal analysis to support his claims, those claims are waived. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
convictions on three counts each of securities fraud, a second 
degree felony, and securities fraud, a third degree felony. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this _/5_ day of October, 2003. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the 
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prepaid, to Sheldon R. Carter, attorney for appellants, Harris & 
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S4604-4438, this j ^ _ day of October, 2003, 
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Addendum A 
Addendum A 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
TERRY J. STEPHENSON and 
GRANT C. MILLS, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendants. 
RULING ON DEFENDANTS' JOINT 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
CASE NO. 981403866 & 981403877 
DATE: FEBRUARY 9, 2001 
JUDGE: LYNN W. DAVIS 
CLERK: SGJ 
On August 14, 2000, defendants Terry J. Stephenson and Grant C. Mills filed a Joint 
Motion to Dismiss, together with a supporting memorandum. Michael D. Esplin, Esq is the 
attorney of record for Grant C. Mills, and Shelden R. Carter, Esq., is the attorney of record for 
Terry J. Stephenson. The memorandum was also supplemented with an affidavit and various 
exhibits. 
The State of Utah filed its Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on September 
13, 2000. On that same date, defendants filed a Request for Ruling. Defendants filed a Reply 
Memorandum on September 22, 2000. 
A hearing on various motions was conducted on September 25, 2000. The Court 
granted a continuance of the jury trial, rescheduled the jury trial, and took the Motion to Dismiss 
under advisement in order to reduce the decision to writing. Subsequently, the State of Utah filed 
a Request for Additional Time to File a Response to the Defendant's Reply on the Motion on 
September 28, 2000. The Court initially granted the motion, then stayed the order. Defendants 
filed an Objection to State's Request for Additional Time to File a Response to Defendants' Reply 
on October 3, 2000. 
A hearing was conducted on October 11, 2000, granting in part and denying in part, 
plaintiffs request. The State of Utah then filed State's Supplemental Memorandum in Response 
to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on November 30, 2000, together with an affidavit. 
In response to the Supplemental Memorandum, the defendants filed a Motion to Strike 
Affidavit of Michael Hines and Letter of S. Anthony Taggart, together with a Memorandum in 
Support of Defendant's Motion to Strike Affidavit of Michael Hines and Letter of S. Anthony 
Taggart. The motion filed on December 29, 2000 is unsigned. A fully executed motion was filed 
on January 2, 2001. No oral argument was requested. The Court will treat the pleading as a 
response to the supplemental memorandum filed by the State of Utah. 
The Court, having carefully reviewed the memoranda of the parties, and having 
considered the arguments of counsel, hereby finds and rules as follows: 
I. 
FACTS 
While the arguments of counsel are legal in nature, it is first necessary to establish some 
facts in order to apply the law. 
The Court finds the following facts: 
1. On April 10, 1998, the Utah County Attorney, on behalf of the State of Utah, filed 
criminal charges in this case against Terry J. Stephenson and Grant C. Mills. Defendant Terry J. 
Stephenson was charged with forty-nine felonies, some of which were charged jointly with 
defendant Grant C. Mills. Defendant, Grant C. Mills was charged with twenty-one felonies, some 
of which were charged jointly with defendant Terry J. Stephenson. The actual charges are as 
follows: 
CHARGE DEGREE PARTIES 
Count 1: Securities Fraud A felony Stephenson & Mills 
Count 2: Communications Fraud 2nd degree felony Stephenson 
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Count 3: Securities Fraud 
Count 4: Securities Fraud 
Count 5: Communications Fraud 
Count 6: Securities Fraud 
Count 7: Communications Fraud 
Count 8: Securities Fraud 
Count 9: Theft by Fiduciary 
Count 10: Securities Fraud 
Count 11: Communications Fraud 
Count 12: Securities Fraud 
Count 13: Communications Fraud 
Count 14: Theft by Fiduciary 
Count 15: Securities Fraud 
Count 16: Communications Fraud 
Count 17: Securities Fraud 
Count 18: Communications Fraud 
Count 19: Securities Fraud 
Count 20: Communications Fraud 
Count 21: Theft by Fiduciary 
A felony 
A felony 
2nd degree felony 
A felony 
2nd degree felony 
A felony 
2nd degree felony 
A felony 
2nd degree felony 
A felony 
2nd degree felony 
2nd degree felony 
A felony 
2nd degree felony 
A felony 
2nd degree felony 
A felony 
2nd degree felony 
2nd degree felony 
Stephenson & Mills 
Stephenson & Mills 
Stephenson 
Stephenson & Mills 
Stephenson 
Stephenson & Mills 
Stephenson 
Stephenson & Mills 
Stephenson 
Stephenson & Mills 
Stephenson 
Stephenson 
Stephenson & Mills 
Stephenson 
Stephenson & Mills 
Stephenson 
Stephenson & Mills 
Stephenson 
Stephenson 
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Count 22: Securities Fraud 
Count 23: Communications Fraud 
Count 24: Securities Fraud 
Count 25: Communications Fraud 
Count 26: Theft by Fiduciary 
Count 27: Securities Fraud 
Count 28: Communications Fraud 
Count 29: Securities Fraud 
Count 30: Securities Fraud 
Count 31: Theft by Fiduciary 
Count 32: Theft by Fiduciary 
Count 33: Theft by Fiduciary 
Count 34: Theft by Fiduciary 
Count 35: Securities Fraud 
Count 36: Communications Fraud 
Count 37: Theft by Fiduciary 
Count 38: Theft by Deception 
Count 39: Securities Fraud 
Count 40: Securities Fraud 
A felony 
2nd degree felony 
A felony 
2nd degree felony 
2nd degree felony 
A felony 
2nd degree felony 
A felony 
A felony 
2nd degree felony 
2nd degree felony 
2nd degree felony 
2nd degree felony 
A felony 
2nd degree felony 
2nd degree felony 
2nd degree felony 
A felony 
A felony 
Stephenson & Mills 
Stephenson 
Stephenson & Mills 
Stephenson 
Stephenson 
Stephenson & Mills 
Stephenson 
Stephenson & Mills 
Stephenson & Mills 
Stephenson 
Stephenson 
Stephenson 
Stephenson 
Stephenson & Mills 
Stephenson 
Stephenson 
Stephenson 
Stephenson & Mills 
Stephenson & Mills 
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Count 41: Communications Fraud 
Count 42: Communications Fraud 
Count 43: Communications Fraud 
Count 44: Issuing a Bad Check or 
Draft 
Count 45: Issuing a Bad Check or 
Draft 
Count 46: Issuing a Bad Check or 
Draft 
Count 47: Issuing a Bad Check or 
Draft 
Count 48: Offer or Sale of 
Securities by Unlicensed Agent 
Count 49: Offer of Sale of 
Securities by Unlicensed Agent 
Count 50: Offer of Sale of 
Securities by Unlicensed Agent 
2nd degree felony 
2nd degree felony 
2nd degree felony 
2nd degree felony 
2nd degree felony 
2nd degree felony 
2nd degree felony 
A felony 
A felony 
A felony 
Stephenson 
Stephenson 
Stephenson 
Stephenson 
Stephenson 
Stephenson 
Stephenson 
Mills 
Mills 
Mills 
Count 51: Issuing a Bad Check or 3rd degree felony 
Draft 
Count 52: Racketeering 2 degree felony 
Stephenson 
Stephenson 
2. From May 17, 1993 to July 8, 1998, Mark J. Griffin (Griffin) was the Director of 
the Division of Securities of the Department of Commerce of the State of Utah. (Affidavit of 
Mark J. Griffin, P. 1, Paragraph 1 attached to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss) 
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3. In March of 1995, Griffin authorized an investigation of Terry J. Stephenson, 
Grant C. Mills, and Soft-One Corporation to determine if they had violated the provisions of the 
Utah Uniform Securities Act. (Affidavit of Griffin, P. 2 Paragraph 4) 
4. Based upon the findings of the investigation, Griffin referred the case to the Utah 
Attorney General's Office to file a civil complaint attached as Exhibit A to Griffin's affidavit 
which has been filed in support of the Joint Motion to Dismiss. (Affidavit of Griffin, P. 2, 
Paragraph 5) 
5. On or about May 15, 1997, the Utah Attorney General filed a civil action in the 
Third Judicial District Court on behalf of the Division of Securities of the Department of 
Commerce, against Soft-One Corporation, a Utah corporation, Terry John Stephenson and Grant 
Carpenter Mills. 
6. The Verified Complaint alleges five counts of violations of the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act: 
1. The offer and sale of unregistered securities. Count I. 
2. Offers and sales of securities by unlicensed broker-dealers and agents. Count 
II. 
3. Misrepresentation or omissions of material fact. Count III. 
4. Fraudulent and deceptive acts, practices, and course of business. Count IV. 
5. False filings submitted to the state. Count V as to Stephenson and Soft-One 
only. (Verified Complaint, Pages 5-13) 
7. The prayer for relief in the Verified Complaint seeks: 
(a) A Temporary Restraining Order. 
(b) Preliminary Injunction. 
(c) Permanent Injunction. 
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(d) Restoration to each person in interest any consideration which may have been 
acquired or transferred in violation of the Utah Uniform Securities Act or that 
a receiver be appointed to take control of the assets of Soft One Corporation. 
(e) A comprehensive accounting of each royalty agreement or other investment in 
Soft-One. 
(f) A civil penalty not to exceed $500.00 for each violation of the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act, but not to exceed the cost and other expenses of the Division's 
investigation. 
(g) Attorneys fees and costs. 
(Verified Complaint, Pages 13-19) 
8. Later proceedings in the case resulted in criminal contempt against defendants 
Stephenson and Mills. (Exhibit 1 attached to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss) 
9. The issues in the civil case in the Third District Court were resolved and settled 
pursuant to the provisions of a Stipulation for Judgment and Permanent Injunction filed on April 
15, 1998, and a Judgment and Permanent Injunction filed on April 16, 1998. (Affidavit of Griffin, 
Page 2, Paragraph 6) (Copies attached to Defendant's Motion) 
10. Griffin does not have a recollection of referring the case to the Utah County 
Attorney for criminal prosecution of defendants. (Affidavit of Griffin, Page 2, Paragraph 7) 
11. The Utah County Attorney investigated defendants for violations of the Utah 
Uniform Securities Act. (Affidavit of Griffin, Page 2, Paragraph 7) 
12. The Utah Securities Division cooperated with the Utah County Attorney in the 
investigation. (Affidavit of Griffin, Page 2, Paragraph 7) 
13. Michael Hines has been the Director of Enforcement for the Utah Division of 
Securities for approximately five years as of September 27, 2000. He supervised Ellen Bloedell in 
her investigation of Grant Mills and Terry Stephenson and he had responsibility for overseeing all 
aspects of that investigation. (Affidavit of Michael Hines, filed as attachment to State's 
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Supplemental Memorandum in Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on November 30, 
2000.) 
14. Having received prior approval of then Director Mark Griffin, Mr. Hines instructed 
Ellen Bloedel to take the (Mills and Stephenson) matter to the Utah County Attorney's Office and 
solicit the aid of that office in a criminal prosecution. (Affidavit of Michael Hines, Paragraph 7) 
15. The Utah Division of Securities has no formal written procedures for referring 
cases to other agencies, and the actions of the Division in this instance are consistent with (the 
Division's) operating procedure. (Affidavit of Michael Hines, Paragraph 8) 
16. Thereafter, on or about April 10, 1998, the Utah County Attorney filed this case 
against the defendants. 
OL 
LEGAL ISSUES 
Defendants present two arguments in their briefs: 
A. The Utah County Attorney has no standing or authority to investigate or prosecute 
defendants for violations of the Utah Uniform Securities Act; 
B. Prosecution of this case is barred by the Utah and federal constitutional 
prescription against double jeopardy. 
This Court will address each issue separately below. 
A. 
Lack of Jurisdiction 
It is the argument of defendants that the Utah County Attorney had no authority to file 
the Information in this matter, nor to prosecute this action; therefore, the Court lacks jurisdiction 
over these defendants. 
It is clear that the director of the Division of Securities is charged with the 
administration and enforcement of the Utah Uniform Securities Act Utah County Ann §61-1-
13(8) and §61-l-18(l)(c). The director has specific administrative and civil powers. 
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In that connection, under the authority of Utah Code Ann §61-1-20 (2)(a) and (b) the 
director may bring a civil action. Consider: 
(2)(a) The director may bring an action in the appropriate district 
court of this state or the appropriate court of another state to enjoin 
the acts or practices and to enforce compliance with this chapter or 
any rule or order under this chapter; 
(b) upon a proper showing in an action brought under this section, the court may: 
(i) issue a permanent or temporary, prohibitory or mandatory injunction; 
(ii) issue a restraining order or writ of mandamus; 
(iii) enter a declaratory judgment; 
(iv) appoint a receiver or conservator for the defendant or the defendant's 
assets; 
(v) order disgorgement; 
(vi) order rescission; 
(vii) impose a fine of not more than $500 for each violation of the act; and 
(viii) enter any other relief the court considers just. . . 
The director proceeded under this provision in seeking injunctive relief in the Third 
District Court. 
In addition to civil remedies, the director may refer the case for criminal actions under 
the authority of Utah Code Ann. §61-1-21.5 (3) as set forth below: 
In the prosecution of all criminal actions under this chapter, the 
attorney general, county attorney, or district attorney of the 
appropriate jurisdiction, shall provide all legal services for the 
division and its staff The division may refer such evidence as is 
available concerning violations of this chapter to the attorney 
general or the appropriate county attorney or district attorney for 
criminal prosecution. 
Based upon the above, defendants argue that the Utah County Attorney cannot 
investigate or prosecute violations of the Utah Uniform Securities Act unless he is specifically 
requested to do so by the director of the Division. Defendants further argue that at the time the 
Utah County Attorney commenced his investigation of the defendants, and when he later filed a 
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criminal Information against them, he did not have any authority from Director Griffen, the person 
empowered with the authority to enforce violations of the Act. Further, defendants rely upon the 
case of Salt Lake County Com'n v. County Attorney. 985 P.2d 899, 905 which stands for the 
proposition that a public attorney is bound by the ethics of attorney-client relationship in 
representing his public client and as such cannot act independently of the instructions of his client. 
The State counters these arguments, relying upon general prosecutorial powers found in 
UCA §17-18-l(l)(a) which provides that the county attorneys have the duty to "conduct on 
behalf of the State all prosecutions for public offenses committed within (their) county." (See 
also UCA §17-18-1.7(l)(a)) 
The State has contended all along that no referral is necessary for it to bring this action, 
and that no written or formal referral was ever obtained, but that it has independent statutory 
authority to proceed in this case. Only in late briefing does the Utah County Attorney claim that 
there was an informal referral to the County Attorney's Office. 
This Court opines that the Utah County Attorney has separate, statutory authority to 
commence criminal actions for violation of the law within county boundaries. But, even without 
that authority, the County Attorney had authority from the Division of Securities to proceed. 
Director Griffin in his affidavit states the following: "I do not recall referring this case for criminal 
prosecution of Terry J. Stephenson and Grant C. Mills." Griffen did not state that he did not refer 
or did not authorize the criminal investigation or criminal Information. 
What is clear from the facts is that the Division had no formalized rules in place 
respecting referrals. The Act is silent as to how referrals are made. The affidavit of Michael 
Hines, the Director of Enforcement for the Utah Division of Securities, oversaw the investigation 
of Grant Mills and Terry Stephenson. He personally instructed Ellen Bloedell, a Division 
investigator, to take the investigation to the Utah County Attorney's Office and solicit the aid of 
that office in a criminal prosecution. (See generally paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7 of his affidavit) 
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Michael Hines, the Director of Enforcement for the Utah Division of Securities, further 
stated under oath that he followed this procedure after receiving prior approval of then Director 
Mark Griflfen. (Paragraph 7 of the Michael Hines Affidavit) Lastly, Mr. Hines states that "the 
Utah Division of Securities has no formal written procedures for referring cases to other agencies, 
and the actions of the Division in this instance are consistent with our standard operating 
procedure." (Paragraph 8 of the Michael Hines Affidavit) 
Defendants' reliance upon Salt Lake County Com'n v. County Attorney must fail for 
the following reasons: 
a. There is evidence of a referral and cooperation in the investigation and 
prosecution; 
b. The director of the Division is not a party to the action and has not challenged the 
investigation/prosecution as in the Salt Lake County case. 
It appears to the Court that an informal referral was made by the Division to the Utah 
County Attorney's Office. In so finding, it does not rely upon the letter of S. Anthony Taggert, 
current Director of the Division of Securities. That letter is rejected. Further, the Court does not 
rely upon paragraph 6 of the Michael Hines' Affidavit. His intention in bringing the civil case is 
not relevant. 
Accordingly, the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is denied. 
B. 
Prosecution of this Case is Barred bv the Utah and Federal Constitutional 
Proscription Against Double Jeopardy 
Defendants rely upon Article I of the Utah Constitution which provides that no person 
"shall... be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." Defendants move for the dismissal of 
the criminal charges filed against them on the grounds that the charges constitute an attempt to 
punish them twice for the same conduct and therefore violate their state constitutional right 
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against double jeopardy. Defendants also rely upon the federal constitution's proscription against 
double jeopardy. 
Since defendants have set forth no separate legal analysis under the Utah Constitution 
and have not "suggested a reason that warrants a district analytical treatment" under the Utah 
Constitutibn, this Court, as in State of Utah v. Davis. 972 P.2d 388, et seq. does not consider 
alternative state grounds. What is clear from the outset, though never briefed by the State of 
Utah, is that the double jeopardy argument does not lie for criminal actions which are not based 
upon the same set of facts of the violations contained in the civil action. 
Accordingly, the Court denies the defendants' motion to dismiss as to the following 
charges contained in the criminal information: 
COUNT 
9 
14 
21 
26 
31 
32 
33 
34 
37 
38 
44 
CHARGE 
Theft by Fiduciary 
Theft by Fiduciary 
Theft by Fiduciary 
Theft by Fiduciary 
Theft by Fiduciary 
Theft by Fiduciary 
Theft by Fiduciary 
Theft by Fiduciary 
Theft by Fiduciary 
Theft by Deception 
Issuing a Bad Check 
DEFENDANT 
Stephenson 
Stephenson 
Stephenson 
Stephenson 
Stephenson 
Stephenson 
Stephenson 
Stephenson 
Stephenson 
Stephenson 
Stephenson 
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45 
46 
47 
51 
52 
Issuing a Bad Check 
Issuing a Bad Check 
Issuing a Bad Check 
Issuing a Bad Check 
Issuing a Bad Check 
Stephenson 
Stephenson 
Stephenson 
Stephenson 
Stephenson 
Defendants claim that "there is no question that the civil action involved the same set of 
facts and violations as are charged in the criminal Information herein." (See Memorandum in 
Support of Motion to Dismiss at page 23). But no evidence was presented to support that 
statement. 
In order to assert a double jeopardy claim, the defendants have the burden to establish a 
sufficient nexus on the record between the current charges and the acts which were the subject of 
the civil action. This Court has carefully reviewed, paragraph by paragraph, the Verified 
Complaint in the civil action, the Stipulation to Judgment, the Order and Judgment entered in the 
case, and charges contained in the criminal Information. No court can, absent evidence, 
automatically assume the nexus. 
Query: What are the predicate acts in support of Count 52, 
Racketeering? How can the Racketeering charge be 
dismissed under a double jeopardy theory unless the 
necessary predicate acts are those based upon the same 
set of facts contained in the civil complaint? 
Query: The State has charged these defendants with 
Communications Fraud in Counts 2, 5, 7, 11, 13, 16, 18, 
20, 23, 25, 28, 36, 42 and 43. A "Communication Fraud" 
charge is very broad in nature and may or may not involve 
acts claimed in the civil case. Absent any evidence, how 
can the Court decide the application of double jeopardy? 
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Defendants are faced with an insurmountable hurdle in establishing the necessary nexus. 
They stipulated that the Judgment and Permanent Injunction could "be presented to the Court 
immediately or at any time convenient to the Court without the necessity of findings of fact or 
conclusions of law. . ." (Stipulation for Judgment and Permanent Injunction, paragraph 6, 
emphasis added). 
It is difficult, without findings, to link any specific charge in the criminal Information 
with any specific act established in the civil action. The mere allegations contained in the Verified 
Complaint are insufficient. The Court must focus exclusively upon the stipulation and the 
resulting judgment. 
But the stipulation is remarkably silent as to names of "victims/investors," dates of 
offenses, amounts of money generated and which defendants participated in any unlawful activity. 
The stipulation also joins the corporate entity Soft-One Corporation which further complicates the 
double jeopardy argument. 
Next, this case is distinguishable from other cases because no fines or fees were 
assessed, there was no ascertainment of damages, if any, either by the judge, by a jury or by 
stipulation. Defendants correctly point out that pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §61-1-22 (l)(b) a 
court "may award an amount equal to three times the consideration paid for the security." While 
the amount may be punitive, it was never ordered by the trial court in the civil case. Again, no 
money damages were ever agreed to by the parties. In Steenblick v. Lichfield. 906 P.2d 872, 881 
(Utah 1995), the Utah Supreme Court held that "the treble damages under the Act are punitive in 
nature." But in Lichfield, both punitive and treble damages were actually awarded. That is not 
the case here. In addition, this Court notes that potential fines are not equivalent to actual fines. 
Defendants' calculations respecting potential fines are purely speculative absent any findings of 
the number of violations, not just the alleged number of violations referenced in the Verified 
Complaint. 
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Query: Does there have to be some fine, fee, or damages assessed 
before the traditional double jeopardy analysis applies? 
Does the provision in the Act which could involve 
substantial fees, treble damage awards and restraints 
sufficient to trigger the application of the analysis? Or 
does there have to be actual damages assessed before 
jeopardy may apply! Is the requirement inchoate or 
potential or actual? What if, for example in State v. 
Davis, the forfeiture action, the State never forfeited the 
subject vehicle but potentially could have but never 
elected to do so? What if the parties stipulated that the 
vehicle would not be forfeited, but that if Davis used the 
vehicle in the future to deliver drugs, it would be 
forfeited? Would double jeopardy bar the criminal action. 
Clearly not! Absent the forfeiture, despite the fact that 
the law allows the forfeiture, there is no 
damage/fine/assessment or sanction which would trigger 
the double jeopardy analysis. 
In addition, the very language of the stipulation exempts 
double jeopardy consideration. It speaks of the potential 
future civil suits by investors. The filing of civil suits by 
victims cannot bar criminal prosecutions. 
There has been no evidence presented in this case suggesting that any "victim" has 
initiated suit against these defendants, that any "victim" has been awarded any judgment, that any 
"victim" has been paid any amount of money, or that any "victim" has exercised or asserted any 
rights under the Utah Uniform Securities Act. Nor is there any evidence that any civil penalty or 
fine was imposed in the civil case. 
Lastly, this case is distinguishable from other double jeopardy cases because of the 
language contained in paragraph 5 of the Stipulation for Judgment and Permanent Injunction 
which reads: "At this time, and for purposes of this civil action only, and without acknowledging 
or admitting any criminal liability, Defendant admits the following:" (emphasis added) Clearly, 
the defendants understood that the stipulation was a final resolution in the civil case. 
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Conclusion to the Double Jeopardy Analysis 
Fundamental to the claim of double jeopardy is an initial showing of actual sanctions or 
punishment imposed in a preceding action. While the damages/fines/fees/punishment/treble 
damages sanctions available in the Utah Uniform Securities Act make for an interesting argument, 
these parties entered into a stipulated judgment which ignored the Act's punishment/sanction 
provisions. The Court must look directly to the "Stipulation for Judgment and Permanent 
Injunction," together with the Judgment and Permanent Injunction in search of an imposed 
recognized punishment or sanction sufficient to trigger a double jeopardy claim. A stipulation to 
permanent injunction to cease from future illegal acts is insufficient. 
This case is distinguishable from other double jeopardy cases for the following reasons: 
1. There was a stipulation to Judgment and Permanent Injunction; 
2. No fines, treble damages, civil penalties or other monetary sanctions were ever 
imposed; 
3. Defendants could be held in contempt for future independent violations, and 
double jeopardy might attach as to those violations if a court imposed 
incarceration. But that begs the question of past activities. 
4. The language of the stipulation itself seems to carve out a waiver to a double 
jeopardy claim; 
5. There are no findings of fact or conclusions of law in the civil action, and no 
evidence presented in this motion sufficient for this Court to determine a specific 
nexus between the activities charged in the criminal action and the activities which 
were the basis of the civil action. This Court cannot speculate respecting this 
critical issue nor can it engage in the unraveling of the stipulation and judgment in 
the civil action in order to produce findings. 
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6. Clearly, some criminal charges in this action have nothing to do with the civil 
action; bad check charges, theft by fiduciary, etc Defendants cannot claim double 
jeopardy for these charges absent a showing of additional facts. 
7. The fact that the civil action joins three defendants, one of which is a corporation, 
also distinguishes this case from a standard double jeopardy case. 
Accordingly, the Court finds that these defendants have not been placed in jeopardy as a 
result of the civil action. These defendants were simply permanently enjoined, by stipulation, 
from participating in future activities which would violate the securities laws. 
RULING 
Based upon the above-analysis, defendants' motion to dismiss based upon lack of 
jurisdiction, and based upon a double jeopardy claim, is hereby denied Counsel for the State of 
Utah is instructed to prepare an Order consistent with this ruling. Defendants' Motion to Strike is 
granted in part and denied in part. 
Dated this ? day of February, 2001. 
BY imCOURT 
TW.DAVIS, JUDGE 
cc: Phil Hadfield 
Michael D< Esplin 
Shelden R. Carter 
„1 t 
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-17-
Addendum B 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
vs. 
TERRY J. STEPHENSON and 
GRANT C. MILLS, 
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Defendants. 
SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS AND 
CONCLUSIONS RESPECTING THE 
COURT'S RULING ON 
DEFENDANTS' JOINT MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
CASE NO. 981403866 & 981403877 
DATE: MARCH 23, 2001 
JUDGE: LYNN W. DAVIS 
CLERK: SGJ 
This Court ruled on defendants' joint motion to dismiss on February 9, 2001. On 
February 22, 2001, the Court scheduled a further hearing, in light of the decision, in order to reset 
a jury trial in the case and to make a status report on the record. Brief argument was entertained 
and it was mutually agreed by the parties to schedule a further evidentiary hearing allowing both 
sides to further examine the affiants who filed affidavits utilized in support of, and in opposition 
to, the motions to dismiss. The Court agreed to accommodate the parties and to allow the record 
to be supplemented in lieu of a separate hearing on the motion to strike. 
An evidentiary hearing was conducted on March 21, 2001. Defendant, Grant C. Mills, 
was present and represented by Michael D. Esplin, Esq. Defendant, Terry J. Stephenson, was 
present and represented by Shelden R. Carter, Esq. The State of Utah was represented by Phillip 
Hadfield, Deputy Utah County Attorney, and David Wayment, Deputy Utah County Attorney. 
On March 21, 2001, the Court heard testimony from Mark J. Griffin, Michael Hines, 
Ellen Bloedell, Doug Whitney and Wayne Klein. The Court makes the following supplemental 
findings from the hearing. 
1. Mark J. Griffin was the Director of the Utah Division of Securities as of May 15, 
1997. As director, he supervised staff and had a duty to investigate violations of securities' laws. 
The Division was divided into an enforcement section, a registration section, and an application 
section. 
2. The Division conducted investigations, but did not handle prosecutions of 
violations; violations were referred for prosecution. 
3. There was not an established, particularized referral process for prosecution. The 
informal process involved taking files to the prosecuting agency for screening. There was not a 
letter of referral nor was there a paper trail because there was no statutory requirement to do that. 
4. The Division thoroughly investigated Stephenson and Mills, and Griffin was aware 
that his investigators were working closely with the Utah County Attorney to prosecute the case. 
Griffin trained and encouraged the Division's investigators to work closely with local prosecutors 
and to cultivate professional ties with local prosecutors. Griffin was well aware of Utah County's 
interest. 
5. The process of referral is very informal, is "seamless," and once referred for 
screening, the Division acts in a supportive role only. The decision as to what charges to file is 
left exclusively to local prosecution. 
6. Griffin heavily recruited and eventually hired Michael Hines as the Director of the 
Enforcement Division and authorized him to refer cases for prosecution. Hines was very good at 
keeping Griffin informed of the investigation and prosecutorial status of each case, and Griffin 
believed that Hines (consulted with him in this case particular though he has no personal 
recollection. Griffin expected Hines to refer cases for prosecution and specifically instructed and 
delegated him to do so. 
7. The professional working relationship between the Utah Division of Securities and 
the Utah County Attorney's Office was becoming "stellar." 
8. During 1996 -1997 Griffin served as president of NASA (North American 
Securities Association). In that capacity he was out of the office twenty-five percent of the year. 
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9. Wavne Klein. Esq. is an attorney with the Attorney General's Office assigned to 
the Consumer Right's Division, and was the attorney who brought the civil action against these 
defendants. 
10. The Consumer Right's Division, after meeting with investigators for the Utah 
Division of Securities, may proceed with civil, administrative or criminal actions against 
individuals or may proceed with all three actions. Generally his office tries not to proceed with 
separate actions simultaneously because of potential intra-office evidentiary conflicts. 
11. Mr. Klein was aware that Utah County was investigating Mills and Stephenson. 
12. In determining whether to initially proceed with an administrative, criminal or civil 
action, the Division considers: 
a. the severity of the case, including the number of victims; 
b. whether a temporary restraining order is necessary to stop ongoing fraud; 
c. whether the Division wishes to immediately attach assets. 
13. While the Division does not engage in simultaneous prosecution, the bringing of 
one action does not foreclose the bringing of a separate action and the Attorney General's Office 
historically has, depending on the case, sought multiple non-simultaneous remedies. 
14. Klein had no memory of any forbearance discussion in the civil case of future 
criminal prosecution. He testified that any such agreement would have been reflected in the 
stipulated judgment and that there was no such provision in the stipulation. Secondly, he testified 
that the promise of immunity is subject to a specific separate process in his office, not extant in 
this case. 
15. Doug Whitney has been employed in the investigation division of the Utah County 
Attorney's Office for approximately ten years. 
16. Whitney was approached by David and Craig Smith on or about March 27, 1997, 
respecting a bad check involving Mills and/or Stephenson. Whitney took a statement regarding 
the matter and opened a criminal investigation. 
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17. Sometime later (a few weeks to a few months) Whitney met with Mike Hines and 
Ellen Bloedell at Salt Lake City. The Utah Division of Securities had been investigating Mills and 
Stephenson. Whitney also coordinated investigative efforts with the FBI and the US Department 
of Labor. Whitney and the Securities Division cooperated in the continued investigation of Mills 
and Stephenson. 
18. Soft-One Corporation was being operated in Utah County and all of its employees 
worked in Utah County. Whitney recognized that only a few of the investors resided in Utah 
County. 
19. Bloedell, an investigator assigned to the case in the Utah Division of Securities, 
met with Whitney in Utah County, provided information which the Division had collected, and 
systematically arranged all of the Division's investigative material compatibly with the County's 
investigative material. 
20. Whitney then took all of the evidence which had been secured by the Division and 
his own investigative efforts to Craig Madsen, Deputy Utah County Attorney, for prosecution. 
That resulted in the filing of the charges in this case. Whitney considered this to be his case, even 
with the Division's information and cooperation. 
21. Ellen Bloedell was an investigator with the Utah Division of Securities, which 
authorized her contact in behalf of the Division with Whitney regarding the Stephenson and Mills 
investigation. She contacted witnesses and made reports as she focused on potential criminal 
charges involving Securities Act violations by Mills and Stephenson. 
22. Michael Hines was her immediate supervisor and she reported periodically to him. 
She further testified! that there was no written referral or permission process. 
23. Bloedell continued her investigation in this case after her meeting with Whitney 
and she corroborated the testimony of Whitney respecting the meetings, the cooperative 
investigation, and the supplying of files and information to the Utah County Attorney's Office. 
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24. Michael Hines has served as Director of Enforcement of the Utah Division of 
Securities since 1995. 
25. Hines never used a formal written referral to any agency to pursue prosecution of a 
case and no written referrals were utilized prior to 1995 when he served as Chief of Securities 
with the Utah Attorney General's Office. 
26. Hines, in his enforcement capacity, sought civil remedies for emergency relief not 
available through the criminal process. 
27. Hines, who supervised investigator Bloedell in the Stephenson/Mills investigation, 
instructed her to screen the case with the Utah County Attorney's Office. 
28. Hines further testified that the procedure used in this case was the normal process 
of referral from his office to a prosecuting agency. 
29. According to Hines, he apprised Griffin of the investigation and the referral was 
authorized by Griffin. 
SUPPLEMENTAL CONCLUSIONS 
The testimony of Mark J. Griffin, Michael Hines and Ellen Bloedell clearly bolster the 
State's position that the Mills/Stephenson investigation was referred by the Utah Division of 
Securities to the Office of Utah County Attorney for screening and prosecution. There was a 
fully cooperative gathering of facts which were presented to Craig Madsen in support of the 
criminal charges filed in this case. The referral for prosecution in this case was informal, but 
consistent in every way with the Division's policy. 
There is no evidence that there was any forbearance agreement, or promise of immunity 
in the civil case which would, in any way, affect the criminal prosecution of the case. Once the 
referral for prosecution was made, the Utah Division of Securities maintained a supportive role. 
Traditionally and historically, upon presentment of the case for screening to the prosecutor, it is 
the prosecutor, not the Division who determines the number of charges, etc. That is precisely 
what was done here. 
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RULING 
Based upon the testimony at the hearing, the State's position is further strengthened and 
clarified. Defendants' motion to dismiss based upon lack of jurisdiction and based upon a double 
jeopardy claim is denied. 
Counsel for the State of Utah is instructed to prepare an Order consistent with this 
supplemental ruling and the original ruling. The Court is aware that the supplemental findings 
overlap with and are, in part, a duplication of the original findings, but they are derived from 
actual testimony as opposed to affidavit testimony. 
Dated this £3 day of March, 2001. 
BY THECOURT 
cc: Phil Hadfield 
Michael D. Esplin 
Shelden R. Carter 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUHt> County State of Utah 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
TERRY J. STEPHENSON and GRANT 
MILLS, 
Defendants. 
RULING 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 981403866 
981403877 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Suppress. The Court has 
reviewed the file, considered the memoranda filed by the parties, heard oral arguments, and being 
fully advised in the premises, issues the following: 
RULING 
This Court relies on the following findings of facts for the determination of the issue. The 
Utah Division of Securities (Division) began an investigation of the defendants and Soft-One 
Corporation in March 1995 for violations of the Utah Uniform Securities Act (Securities Act). 
Ellen Bloedel, a securities compliance investigator for the Division conducted the investigation. 
The Defendants never challenged the administrative subpoenas issued by Division while 
conducting this investigation. Based on the information discovered in Bloedel's investigation, 
and at the request of Division director Mark Griffin, the Attorney General initiated a civil 
complaint against the Defendants and Soft-One Corporation. This complaint resulted in a 
stipulation for judgment entered into by the State and Defendant Stephenson on March 23, 1998 
and the State and Defendant Mills on April 16, 1998. 
The Utah County Attorney's Office (UCAO) first learned of the current allegations on or 
8.1 
about March 27, 1997 when David and Craig Smith approached Utah County investigator Doug 
Witney, and began to investigate. (Supplemental Findings, Judge Davis, March 23, 2001, ^ 16). 
Subsequently, Witney met with Mike Hines and Ellen Bloedell in Salt Lake City. From that time 
forward, the Division cooperated with UCAO, and the UCAO took the lead into the investigation 
of the criminal allegations against the Defendants. On April 10, 1998, the UCAO filed criminal 
charges against Defendants Stephenson and Mills. On September 28, 2001, the Defendants 
stipulated to the entry of guilty pleas if the outcome of this motion and any subsequent appeal 
goes against them and the jury trial was stricken. 
Defendants filed this motion to suppress all evidence obtained by the UCAO from the 
Division, the Division's attorneys, investigators or other personnel. In support of this motion, the 
Defendants argue that Utah Code Ann. §61-1-19 (2000), which grants the Division investigatory 
powers including the authority to issue subpoenas, is unconstitutional as applied because it 
allowed the Division to conduct a criminal investigation without Constitutional protections. 
According to the Defendants, the statute is unconstitutional because it violates the Defendants' 
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures; the Separation of 
Powers as contained in the Utah State Constitution article V, § 1; the Defendants' right against 
self-incrimination contained in the Fifth Amendment and Utah State Constitution article I, § 12, 
the Equal Protection Clause and Utah State Constitution article I, § 24; and the Due Process 
Clause and Utah State Constitution article I, §§ 7 and 14. 
The State argues that Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-19 is not unconstitutional because the 
Division's responsibilities require it to prevent and detect violations of the Securities Act 
Though the division conducted an investigation into the Defendants' conduct in relation to Utah's 
securities law, the State argues that this investigation did not constitute an unreasonable search or 
seizure. The State also contends that the authority to issue subpoenas is not a delegation of core 
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judicial functions; the Defendants' right against self-incrimination was not violated because they 
were informed in the subpoenas and in interviews of this right; the Equal Protection clause was 
not violated because the Division's power to issue subpoenas does not create an alternate method 
of initiating criminal prosecutions; and the Due Process Clause was not violated because the 
Division conducted an investigation by administrative subpoena and did not conduct a criminal 
investigation. 
Discussion 
The Defendants claim that the evidence obtained by the Division cannot be used in this 
criminal case because the Division's investigation did not provide the Defendants with 
constitutionally guaranteed protections in criminal investigations. According to the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act, the Division "in its discretion may make any public or private investigation within 
or without this state as it considers necessary to determine whether any person has violated, is 
violating, or is about to violate any provision of this chapter or any rule or order hereafter " Utah 
Code Ann §61-1-19 (2000). In order to conduct these investigations, the statue allows the 
Division to subpoena witnesses, take evidence, and require the production of documents. See id. 
The statute also allows the Division to "refer such evidence as is available concerning violations of 
this chapter to the attorney general or the appropriate county attorney or district attorney for 
criminal prosecution." Utah Code Ann. §61-1-22 (2000). The issue in this case is whether 
evidence gathered by the Division through administrative subpoenas may be turned over to the 
attorney general, county attorney or district attorney for use in a criminal prosecution. 
First, Defendants accurately state that the Utah Supreme Court has only recognized two 
methods of investigating a criminal case prior to the filing of an information by grand jury 
according to the Grand Jury Reform Act (Grand Jury Act), Utah Code Ann §77-10a-l et seq 
(1999), or in accordance with the Subpoena Powers for Aid of Criminal Investigations and Grants 
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of Immunity (Subpoena Powers Act), Utah Code Ann. §77-22-1 et seq. (2000). See also In the 
Matter of a Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633, 636 (Utah 1988). Witnesses investigated under 
either method must be informed of their right to counsel, their right to remain silent or privilege 
against self-incrimination, the nature of the proceeding, and that they are targets of the 
investigation See Utah Code Ann. §77-10a-13(4) (1999) (Grand Jury Act); Utah Code Ann. 
§77-22-2(5) (Supp. 2001) (Subpoena Powers Act); In the Matter of Criminal Investigation. 754 
P.2d at 652. The rights of witnesses are additionally protected by the courts who provide some 
supervision over the conduct of the criminal investigation. See Utah Code Ann. §77-10a-2 
(1999) (a panel of five judges is appointed to oversee grand jury investigations); Utah Code Ann. 
§77-22-2(a) (Supp. 2001) (a prosecutor must obtain the approval of a district court upon good 
cause shown to conduct a criminal investigation); In the Matter of a Criminal Investigation 754 
P.2d at 643-644. While there is some evidence that administrative subpoenas issued by the 
Division complied with the statutory requirements for criminal investigations by informing the 
Defendants of their rights,1 there is no evidence that any court directly supervised the Division's 
investigation. Because evidence obtained by the Division has been turned over to the UCAO and 
was not obtained in accordance with the rules governing criminal investigations, the Defendants 
argue that all evidence must be suppressed. 
While the Defendants' argument has some merit, it is inapplicable to this case because the 
Division is specifically authorized to conduct investigations involving violations of the Securities 
Act Not all violations of the Securities Act are criminal. According to the Securities Act, a 
person is subject to criminal penalties only if that person "willfully violates any provision of [the 
*In its Opposition to the Motion to Suppress, the State provided a copy of a subpoena served on Defendant 
Mills on March 2, 1995. which informed him of his constitutional rights and that he was a target of the 
investigation. The State also states that Ellen Bloedel informed Mills of this same information prior to interviews 
with him. See States Opposition to the Motion to Suppress p. 9-10. No information is provided to show whether 
Defendant Stephenson received the same treatment. 
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Securities Act] . . or who willfully violates any rule or order under [the Securities Act] " Utah 
Code Ann. §61-1-21 (Supp. 2001). Violations of the Securities Act that do not meet the 
requirements for criminal prosecution may result in civil punishments See Utah Code Ann §61-
1-20 (2000). When the Division begins an investigation "to determine whether any person has 
violated" the Securities Act, it is not always apparent whether that person acted with criminal 
intent. However, it is the Division's responsibility to conduct investigations to determine whether 
violations of the Securities Act have occurred whether the investigation will reveal criminal 
activity or not.2 Because any Division investigation could uncover violations of the Securities Act 
punishable as crimes, imposing the same stringent requirements for criminal investigations in the 
Division's activities will severely impact its ability to perform its duties. 
The Defendants' arguments would leave only two possible outcomes - require all Division 
investigations to conform to the constitutionally required protections of criminal investigations or 
refuse to allow any evidence discovered by the Division's investigations from being used in 
criminal prosecutions. However, administrative agencies have long held the authority to conduct 
investigations to aid them in fulfilling their delegated responsibilities. In United States v. Morton 
Salt Co., the United States Supreme Court held that u[w]hen investigative and accusatory duties 
are delegated by statute to an administrative body, it, too, may take steps to inform itself as to 
whether there is probable violation of the law." 338 U.S. 632, 364 (1950). Statutory language 
specifically delegates to the Division the responsibility to ensure compliance with the Securities 
Act and to investigate violations. It cannot perform this function without the ability to question 
individuals about their compliance with the Securities Act. It is neither required by the 
Constitution or by statute, and therefore not required by this Court, that the Division conduct its 
2wThe director [of the Division] shall be responsible for the administration and enforcement of [the 
Securities Act]." Utah Code Ann. §61-l-18(l)(c) (Supp. 2001). 
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investigations under the requirements of the criminal laws because of the mere possibility that 
each investigation may uncover criminal activity Therefore, though the Division's investigation 
of the Defendants did not comply with the requirements of the Subpoena Powers Act and In the 
Matter of a Criminal Investigation, such compliance is not required. 
Since the investigation conducted by the Division did not comply with the requirements 
for a criminal investigation, the Defendants argue that all evidence provided to the UCAO by the 
Division must be suppressed. In support of this argument, the Defendants rely on Zissi v State 
Tax Commission. 842 P.2d 848 (Utah 1992). In Zissi the Utah Supreme Court had to consider 
the constitutionality of the Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act (the Stamp Act), Utah Code Ann §59-19-
101 et seq. (2000). The Stamp Act imposes a tax on marijuana and other controlled substances 
Zissi alleged that this statute is unconstitutional because compliance would require an individual 
to provide incriminating evidence against himself Agreeing with Zissi, the Utah Supreme Court 
held that the statute "violatefd] the federal Constitution because the purchaser would reasonably 
suppose that compliance would make information available to prosecuting authorities and that the 
information would provide a iink in a chain' of evidence that would tend to establish the 
individual's guilt of drug-related offenses." Zissi, 842 P.2d at 857 (citing Marchetti v United 
States, 390 U S. 39, 48 (1968). Though the Court found the Stamp Act to be unconstitutional, it 
decided to revive the statute by imposing a limiting construction, holding "that the statute must be 
read to preclude prosecutors from using any information gained as a result of a stamp purchaser's 
compliance with the tax statute to establish a link in the chain of evidence in a subsequent drug 
prosecution." Id Because the Utah Supreme Court disallowed evidence of compliance with the 
Stamp Act to be used in subsequent prosecutions, the Defendants argue that evidence of illegal 
activity discovered by the Division while conducting an investigation also cannot be used in 
subsequent criminal prosecutions. 
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Zissi is distinguishable from the circumstances in this case, however. In Zissi. the Stamp 
Act required individuals to report possession of controlled substances to the State. This 
information could then be used in later criminal prosecutions to link the individual with the 
controlled substances Compliance with the statute actually exposed individuals to criminal 
punishment because possession of controlled substances is a crime. Here, the Division sought to 
discover whether the Defendants had violated the Securities Act. Complying with the Securities 
Act does not expose anyone to criminal or civil penalties and does not require individuals to 
provide self-incriminating evidence. As the State correctly points out, the offering and selling of 
securities is not illegal, but it is heavily regulated by the Securities Act. The Zissi court's concern 
that the Stamp Act's requirements would necessarily link the individual to a crime led it to 
conclude that compliance with the law could not be used to establish criminal conduct. See Zissi. 
842 P.2d at 857. While compliance with the Securities Act is not and cannot be considered 
criminal, noncompliance with the Securities Act may be criminal if willful and can have serious 
and far reaching consequences if action is not taken quickly. 
In United States v. Kordel. the United States Supreme Court considered whether the 
defendants' constitutional rights were violated by the government's use of civil interrogatories to 
obtain self-incriminating evidence. 397 U.S. 1(1970). The Court rejected the Defendants' 
arguments because they did "not deal here with a case where Government has brought a civil 
action solely to obtain evidence for its criminal prosecution." L± at 12. 
Later, the Court heard arguments on whether the Internal Revenue Service ( I R S ) 
summons should be enforced when the special agent was using them to obtain information of 
criminal activity. See United States v. LaSalle National Bank. 437 U.S. 298 (1978). The Court 
concluded that the I.R.S. "summons must be issued before the Service recommends to the 
Department of Justice that a criminal prosecution, which reasonably would relate to the subject 
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matter of the summons, be undertaken." IdL at 318. Discussing this ruling the Court noted that 
cooperation between the I.R.S. and the Department of Justice " when combined with the 
inherently intertwined nature of the criminal and civil elements of the case, suggests that it is 
unrealistic to attempt to build a partial information barrier between the two branches of the 
executive. Effective use of information to determine civil liability would inevitably result in 
criminal discovery." Id. at 312. 
In another case involving an IRS summons, a federal circuit court determined that as long 
as an appropriate non-criminal purpose existed to support the summons, they could be enforced 
"Nevertheless, even if the primary purpose of the investigation is criminal, an IRS summons will 
be enforced if there is also the legitimate purpose of establishing civil tax liability " United States 
v_Zack, 521 F 2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1970) (citing United States v. Held. 435 F 2d 1361, 1364-65 
(6th Cir. 1970), cert, denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971)). All of these cases allowed the use of 
administrative subpoenas or their equivalent to obtain information that could be used in criminal 
investigations 
Following these decisions, the D.C. Circuit Court heard a case to decide whether the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) could perform a civil investigation contemporaneous 
with a criminal investigation conducted by the United States Department of Justice (Justice) 
Securities and Exchange Commission v Dresser Industries. Inc., 628 F.2d 1368 (D C Cir 1980) 
cert denied 449 U S 993 (1980). This case came about because of concern about questionable 
corporate payments to government officials in the United States and abroad. See id at 1371 
Dresser Industries (Dresser) filed a voluntary report with the SEC regarding some foreign 
payments When the SEC requested access to further documents, Dresser refused to comply 
without promises of confidentiality, but the SEC refused to make any promises and recommended 
a formal investigation of Dresser. At the same time, Justice began investigating "possible criminal 
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violations arising from illegal foreign payments" and requested access to SEC files. Id. at 1372. 
Both the SEC and a grand jury in Washington D.C. issued subpoenas for Dresser's records The 
subpoenas covered many of the same records although the SEC subpoena requested more than 
the grand jury subpoena. Dresser finally complied with the grand jury subpoena, but continued to 
fight the SEC subpoena. See id. at 1373-1374. The District Court held for the SEC and required 
Dresser to comply with the subpoena. 
In its opinion, the Circuit Court noted that "[e]ffective enforcement of the securities laws 
requires that the SEC and Justice be able to investigate possible violations simultaneously." 
Dresser, 628 F 2d at 1377. Because of the SEC's responsibility to oversee compliance with the 
federal securities law, the Court recognized a need to be able to respond quickly to allegations of 
securities violations. See id. The Court also recognized Justice's need to act quickly on 
allegations of criminal behavior. Therefore, the Court held "we should not block parallel 
investigations by these agencies in the absence of'special circumstances' in which the nature of 
the proceedings demonstrably prejudices substantial rights of the investigated party or of the 
government." Id, Because it allowed simultaneous investigations, the Court went on to discuss 
cooperation between SEC and Justice. In this discussion, the quoted LaSalle National Bank, 
stating that "[it] is unrealistic to attempt to build a partial information barrier between the two 
branches of the executive." Id at 1387 (quoting LaSalle National Bank. 437 U.S. 298, 312 
(1978). The Court noted that "[i]n the present case the SEC plainly has a legitimate noncriminal 
purpose for its investigation of Dresser." After reviewing all the issues, the Circuit Court found 
"nothing improper" with the SEC sharing files with Justice or with the SEC and Justice 
conducting simultaneous investigations. Id. at 1388. 
While the above discussion outlines the state of the law at the federal level, it is applicable 
in this instance also. The statutory language allowing the SEC to conduct investigations and to 
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refer evidence discovered from these investigations for criminal prosecution is similar to that in 
the Securities Act. See 15 U.S.C. §77t(a)-(b) (2001).3 In addition, the need for the Division to 
investigate and prevent violations of the Security Act are just as great at the state level as they are 
at the federal level. The interests in prosecuting criminal offenses are just as strong. Since this 
issue has not been decided by Utah courts because Zissi does not apply, this court finds it 
appropriate to follow the law as developed through the federal courts. 
Michael Hines, Director of Enforcement for the Division, testified before this court 
regarding the Division's investigation of the Defendants. He stated that the Division was 
''concerned that possibly there was ongoing conduct violating security statutes that required us to 
make a fairly quick move to cease the violations and at the same time we needed to continue the 
investigation to see if there were violations that should be prosecuted." Hearing on Motions, 
March 21, 2001, p. 56. The Division approached the Attorney General's office to institute a civil 
proceeding and enjoin the Defendants and Soft-One from continuing to violate the Securities Act. 
Only after investors had approached an investigator for the UCAO a criminal investigation began 
According to its authority under the Securities Act, the Division referred evidence to the UCAO 
concerning violations of the Act. It was entirely appropriate for the Division to provide evidence 
15 U.S.C. § lit. Injunctions and prosecutions of offenses 
(a) Investigation of violations. Whenever it shall appear to the Commission, either upon complaint or otherwise, 
that the provisions of this title, or of any rule or regulation prescribed under authority thereof, have been or are 
about to be violated, it may, in its discretion, either require or permit such person to file with it a statement in 
writing, under oath, or otherwise, as to all the facts and circumstances concerning the subject matter which it 
believes to be in the public interest to investigate, and may investigate such facts. 
(b) Action for injunction or criminal prosecution in district court. Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that 
any person is engaged or about to engage in any acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a violation of 
the provisions of this title, or of any rule or regulation prescribed under authority thereof the Commission ma>. in 
its discretion, bring an action in any district court of the United States, or United States court of any Territory, to 
enjoin such acts or practices, and upon a proper showing, a permanent or temporary injunction or restraining order 
shall be granted without bond. The Commission may transmit such evidence as may be available concerning such 
acts or practices to the Attorney General who may, in his discretion, institute the necessary criminal proceedings 
under this title. . . . 
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to the UCAO about the defendants because it developed the evidence through an investigation 
that was not primarily criminal. Therefore, the evidence should not be suppressed merely because 
it came from the Division's investigation. 
In their second argument, the Defendants claim that the Securities Act delegates to the 
Division the power to enforce and review subpoenas in violation of the Utah State Constitution. 
The Utah State Constitution states that: 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three distinct 
departments, the Legislature, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person charged with 
the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any 
function appertaining either of the others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or 
permitted. 
UTAH CONST art. V, § 1. In In the Matter of a Criminal Investigation, the Utah Supreme Court 
discussed this issue as it relates to subpoenas, specifically those issued under the Subpoena 
Powers Act. 754 P.2d 633 (Utah 1988). It held that "[a]s long as the district court retains 
ultimate precompliance control over the enforcement of a subpoena issued pursuant to the Act, 
the judicial function is not delegated unconstitutionally to the executive branch." Id at 642 
Looking at the Subpoena Powers Act, the Court found nothing to restrain the inherent 
supervisory powers of the courts. See id. Therefore the Court held that "[ajbsent an express 
provision attempting to restrict the authorizing court's powers, we construe the Act as not 
interfering with the court's exercise of inherent judicial power." Id 
The Securities Act does not contain any express provision granting the Division the 
authority to enforce subpoenas. Absent this express provision, it is only within the court's 
exercise of inherent judicial power to enforce the subpoenas and there is no unconstitutional 
delegation of judicial powers. In addition, a federal court recently held that "issuance of a 
subpoena initiates an adversary process that can command the production of documents and 
things only after judicial process is afforded." United States v. Bailey, 228 F.3d 341, 348 (4th 
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Cir. 2000). At any time prior compliance with the subpoenas, the Defendants could have 
approached the courts. Had the Defendants failed to comply with the subpoenas, the Division 
could only enforce the subpoena by application to the courts. See Utah Code Ann §78-32-15 
(1996). Because only the district courts could have enforced the subpoena issued by the Division, 
there was no unconstitutional delegation of judicial powers. 
Third, the Defendants argue that their rights against self-incrimination were violated 
because Division's subpoenas compelled them to provide evidence without the protections of 
Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Defendants also argue that the subpoenas failed 
to give them "target" warnings and that the language of the subpoenas was impermissibly 
threatening according to In the Matter of a Criminal Investigation. 754 P 2d 633, 659 (Utah 
1988). The State argues that the Defendants were informed of their fifth amendment rights and 
that "target" warnings are not required. 
The United States Supreme Court held in Miranda that for in-custody interrogations, uto 
permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be 
adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully 
honored." 384 U S. at 467. Miranda is limited in application to in-custody interrogations By 
responding to the subpoenas, the Defendants, however, were never in-custody of law 
enforcement. They had the opportunity, as has already been discussed, to challenge the 
subpoenas in district court. While Miranda does not apply to the Defendants' situation because it 
was non-custodial, it is also obvious from the subpoena issued to Defendant Mills on March 2, 
1995, that the Defendants were informed of their Fifth Amendment right to remain silent 
Additionally, only the Subpoena Powers Act, Utah Code Ann. §77-22-2(5), and the Grand Jury 
Act, Utah Code Ann. §77-10a-13(4)(c) require that defendants be notified of their target status 
Administrative subpoenas have no such requirement. Because the Division's subpoenas did not 
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amount to a criminal investigation, as previously discussed, the laws requiring "target" warnings 
do not apply to the Division's investigation. Finally, the language from In the Matter of a 
Criminal Investigation which the Defendants rely on to argue that threatening language in a 
subpoena may constitute a violation of an individual's Fifth Amendment rights U inapplicable 
here. First, the Defendants failed to provide a copy of any subpoena to the court. Therefore the 
court could not determine the validity of the allegation.4 Second, the courts ruling on threatening 
language dealt only with denials of Fourth Amendment rights, and has nothing to do with the Fifth 
Amendment. See In the Matter of a Criminal Investigation. 754 P.2d 633, 659 (Utah 1988). 
Therefore, the court finds that the Defendants' Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination 
were not violated. 
For their fourth argument, the Defendants claim a violation of the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment and the uniform operation of laws provision of the Utah State 
Constitution. See UTAH CONST, art. I, §24 (stating "All laws of a general nature shall have 
uniform operation). The Defendants argue that by allowing the UCAO to use evidence provided 
by the Division, the UCAO can use methods of criminal investigation other than the two 
authorized by the Subpoena Powers Act and the Grand Jury Act. Because the method of 
investigation is different and the protections required by the Subpoena Powers Act and the Grand 
Jury Act are not available under this method, the Defendants argue that their equal protection 
rights have been violated. The Utah Supreme Court held that "in the absence of some showing 
that the prosecutor is classifying persons improperly, the mere existence of the discretionary 
power to select which mechanism to use does not offend the uniform operations of the laws 
4However, if the Defendants like, the court will use the subpoena that was served on Defendant Mills and 
which was provided by the State in its response to the motion to suppress and presume that an identical subpoena 
was served on the Defendant Stephenson. In that case, the Court finds that both Defendants were adequately 
apprised of their Fifth Amendment rights as required by Miranda. 
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provision of article I, section 24." In the Matter of a Criminal Investigation. 754 P.2d at 758 
The main problem with the Defendants' equal protection argument is that the prosecutor 
never chose to use the Division to conduct his criminal investigation or in any other way abused 
his discretion. The Division began to investigate the Defendants in March of 1995, two years 
before the UCAO began its criminal investigation. In accordance with the Securities Act, the 
Division properly referred evidence obtained through its own investigation to the UCAO 
Because the UCAO only became aware of the Division's investigation after it had begun its own 
investigation, the UCAO had no influence over whether or how the Division conducted its 
investigation and did not treat the Defendants any differently than any other class of people. The 
United States Supreme Court considered whether a showing that only a small percentage of 
eligible Defendants were prosecuted under a habitual criminal statute constituted a violation of 
equal protection rights. See Ovler v. Boles. 368 U.S. 448 (1962). The Court held that "the 
conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional 
violation. Even though the statistics in this case might imply a policy of selective enforcement, it 
was not stated that the selection was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as 
race, religion, or other arbitrary classification. Therefore grounds supporting a finding of a denial 
of equal protection were not alleged." Id at 456. The UCAO did not impermissibly classify the 
defendants by race, religion, or any other arbitrary classification. Because the UCAO did not 
impermissibly classify the Defendants, their equal protection and uniform operation of the law 
rights were not violated. 
Finally, the Defendants argue that the Division's subpoenas violated the Defendants 
Fourth Amendment Due Process rights and Utah Constitution article I, §§ 7 and 14. According 
to the Defendants, these rights were violated because the Division's subpoenas issued without a 
showing of probable cause or articulable suspicion and were not subject to judicial review or 
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oversight. In Doe v United States (In re Administrative Subpoena), the Sixth Circuit considered 
whether administrative subpoenas must meet a probable cause standard. 253 F 3d 256 (6th Cir 
2001). After reviewing the law of administrative subpoenas, the court held that enforcement of 
administrative subpoenas should be based on a reasonable relevance test and that no showing of 
probable cause is required. Specifically, the court held that "[b]oth the Supreme Court and this 
circuit have long applied this test when reviewing administrative subpoena requests, and we see 
no convincing basis upon which to distinguish these binding precedents simply because this 
subpoena was issued pursuant to a criminal, as opposed to civil, investigation." Id_ at 265 As 
previously stated, the Division's investigation did not need to comply with the requirements of the 
Subpoena Powers Act or the Grand Jury Act. Therefore, the Defendants' due process rights were 
not violated 
Because the Statute does not violate any provisions of the United States Constitution or 
the Utah Constitution, the Division properly obtained evidence from the Defendants. In addition, 
it was proper for the Division to refer the evidence to the UCAO. Therefore the evidence should 
not be suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, the Court hereby rules that: 
1. Defendants' Motion ta Suppress is D 
DATED this / Q day of January, 
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Fourth Judicial District Court 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 6QIfl»^ounty State of Utah 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
TERRY STEPHENSON, 
GRANT MILLS, 
Defendant. 
RULING 
Case No. 981403866 
981403877 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Request for Additional Findings of 
Fact. The Court has reviewed the file, considered the memoranda filed by the parties, heard oral 
arguments, and being fully advised in the premises, issues the following: 
RULING 
Many of the additional findings the Defendants would like this Court to find are not 
supported by anything other than allegations. The facts written by this Court in its January 18, 
2002 ruling are hereby reaffirmed and upon reconsideration found to be complete. Therefore, no 
new findings of fact or amendment to the findings of fact need be made. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, the Court hereby rules that: 
1. Defendant's Requestfor Additional FindiBgS"c7&Fact is DENIED. 
DATED this J S "daytff April, 2C 
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Addendum E 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT ^ 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
TERRY J. STEPHENSON AND 
GRANT MILLS, 
Defendants. 
RULING 
Case No. 981403866 
981403877 
Judge Gary D. Stott 
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Review and Reversal of 
the Honorable Ray M. Harding Jr.' Rulings on Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, Suppress, and 
Request Findings of Fact. The Court has received and reviewed the motion filed by the 
defendants, the defendants' addendum to the motion, the state's opposition to the motion, the 
defendants' reply to the state's opposition, the original transcript of the December 21, 2001 
hearing at issue, and all other information provided by the parties pursuant to the motion. Being 
fully advised, the Court issues the following: 
RULING 
The Court agrees with the arguments made by the defendants in that they are entitled to 
have their cases resolved by a competent judge, one who complies with the oath taken at the time 
of being placed on the bench and one who adheres to the statutory and judiciary requirements 
with respect to ethical conduct. Likewise, defendants are entitled to a judge who is not impaired 
while making rulings on their motions or hearing their cases, which rulings would be to the 
detriment of the defendants by reason of the impairment. 
However, in none of the material provided is there sufficient information in which this 
Court can conclude that Judge Harding's rulings on the defendants' motions were somehow 
adversely influenced by reason of his alleged use of illegal substances. Furthermore, to permit 
counsel for the defendants to somehow conduct a review or investigation into Judge Harding's 
personal life, or physical or mental health status at the time that he addressed the issues in 
question in this case, would be nothing more than permitting a fishing expedition without any 
reasonable basis to authorize such expedition. 
CONCLUSTON 
For the above reasons, the Court denies defendant's Motion for Review and Reversal. 
DATED this ILo day of September, 2002. 
GARYD. SVOTT,: JUDGE 
Ruling Page 2 
Addendum F 
Addendum F 
^vWi 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Terry J. Stephenson and Grant 
Mills, 
Defendants and Petitioners. 
FILED , 
Utah Cc :rt uf Appeals 
NCV ! 2 2002 
Pautette Sugg 
Clerk of the Zou^ 
ORDER 
Case No. 20020811-CA 
Before Judges Jackson, Bilings, and Thome. 
This matter is before the court on a petition for permission 
to appeal from an interlocutory order filed pursuant to Rule 5 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Petitioner seeks interlocutory review of Judge Stott's order 
refusing to reverse Judge Harding's denial of Petitioner's motion 
to suppress evidence from trial in this matter. We conclude that 
a ruling at this time would not likely dispose of the case and 
that further development of the record in the trial court would 
be beneficial for this court to review the issues presented. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for permission to 
appeal is denied. 
Dated this fry* day of November, 2002. 
FOR THE COURT: 
«***^!0h&^^ > 
Norman H. Jackson, 
Presiding Judge 
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and take 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Electronically recorded on December 21, 2001) 
THE COURT: 
State versus 
app< 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
MR. 
THE 
sarances 
We'll go ahead and turn to our 1 o'c 
> Stephenson. The record — we'll go 
> for the record. 
WAYMENT: David Wayment for the 
COURT: 
ESPLIN: 
CARTER: 
COURT: 
CARTER: 
ESPLIN: 
COURT: 
Thank you. 
State. 
Michael Esplin for Grant Mills. 
Shelden Carter for Mr. 
And are both defendants 
They are. 
They are, your Honor. 
Very well. We have two 
Stephenson. 
now present? 
motions befo 
the Court. One is the motion to dismiss, and the other 
motion f 
wouldn't 
that the 
I assume 
ahead of 
would be 
or suppression, and I left the file 
mind grabbing those for me. Thank 
on my desk, 
you. I prop 
first matter we've,motioned up is the suppress 
that you're 
the 
MR. 
MR. 
tO c 
THE 
i wanting me to hear the motion to di 
suppress motion; is that right? 
CARTER: 
ESPLIN: 
address 
COURT: 
That's right. 
That would be our preference, your 
that first. 
Okay. Are you prepared 
to dismiss today? It wasn't really noticed 
MR. 
to argue the 
today, but -
WAYMENT: I am. I've told Counsel I more or 
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lock 
ahead 
re 
is the 
if you 
ose 
motion. 
smiss 
Honor, 
motion 
-
less 
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1 (inaudible). I object to it. The Court will remember we were 
2 here earlier on a plea bargain. 
3 THE COURT: Right. 
4 MR. WAYMENT: And in terms of that plea bargain there 
5 was going to be one motion that was going to be argued before 
6 this Court before the plea and that was the motion to suppress. 
7 I think that it's undisputed at this time that the 
8 Securities Division has turned over whatever they've got. They 
9 didn't have much, and I think it's not within either the spirit 
10 or the letter of the plea bargain to go ahead with a motion to 
11 dismiss at this point, and frankly I've told Mr. Carter I don't 
12 feel like I'm being dealt with in good faith to have this extra 
13 motion brought up at this time. 
14 THE COURT: Have I provided anyone the — well, I did 
15 provide oral argument on motions, is the way I termed it, 
16 didn't I? 
17 MR. ESPLIN: Yeah, and that's the way I — I did not 
18 (inaudible) because that covered all the motions. 
19 THE COURT: I'll hear both motions. 
20 MR. ESPLIN: Let me respond to Counsel real briefly, 
21 your Honor. The only reason the motion to suppress was — 
22 or the motion to dismiss was filed, is we had contemplated 
23 ]ust going ahead with the motion to suppress based upon the 
24 information we had at the time that the facts were more or 
25 less stipulated to. That the information upon which Whitney, 
-4-
Detective Whitney at the Utah County Attorney's Office 
Investigative Division proceeded came from the Division. 
Mr. Wayment indicated that in Court the other day. 
He didn't have much of a concern with our facts, but 
when we got their response, the response was that totally 180 
degrees. It said that Detective Whitney had compiled through 
his efforts — although the Division had supplied some 
information, that the majority of the investigation and 
documents and evidence was obtained by Detective Whitney. 
I think that's contrary to the information that had 
been provided, the discovery that had been provided through 
the County Attorney's files. I think that shows a contrary 
indication, but we don't know, because we didn't have access to 
the Division's files to see what they had to determine which — 
what documents came from which source, which is relevant to our 
motion to suppress. 
That's when we got the Court's assistance in getting 
an order of the Court directed to both the Division director 
and also to Mr. Cline, who represented the Division in the 
civil matter, to allow us to look at their files to allow us 
to look at their files so we could make the determination as 
to what was there. 
Then we could -- by comparison we can just see what 
documents came from there, what dates were on the documents, 
and whether or not they had been accumulated by the Division 
-5-
1 under the administration (inaudible) which we're objecting to, 
2 as opposed to independently provided by Mr. Whitney. 
3 THE COURT: Let me ask you a preliminary question if I 
4 might, and that is that why haven't the discovery issues really 
5 been rendered moot by the entry of the Sery plea on behalf of 
6 both of the defendants at this point? 
7 MR. ESPLIN: Because the discovery — the condition of 
8 that plea is that the motion to suppress, which concerns — if 
9 that information — if we relied on that information and the 
10 Court grants our motion to suppress, then there will be no 
11 plea. That will end the case, because they won't have a --
12 well, unless they can have other additional evidence — 
13 THE COURT: Right, but they've already indicated that 
14 their motion to suppress as a part of the Sery plea, they've 
15 indicated that the motion to suppress is dispositive with their 
16 case. So I guess that's why I wonder why it isn't — why this 
17 issue isn't rendered moot by the Sery plea. 
18 MR. ESPLIN: Well, I guess it would be if the State 
19 maintains the position they maintain in their motion. That 
20 was that that would — the evidence was as we set forth. If 
21 it came primarily from the Division, referred from the County 
22 Attorney's Office from the Division — or from the Division to 
23 the County Attorney's Office, and then Mr. Whitney took his 
24 further investigation and information that came from the 
25 Division. 
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1 New we have a different — a change of opinion on 
2 that, or change of statement from that, saying that Whitney 
3 developed, that says a majority of that information — 
4 THE COURT: But as long as their position is consistent 
5 in terms of the motion to suppress, you would agree that it's a 
6 moot issue as to discovery at this point? 
7 MR, ESPLIN: Yes, if they stipulate and agree that the 
8 investigation materia]s primarily came either directly from the 
9 Division or as a result of information provided by the Division 
10 through their investigation and their subpoena. I think it is 
11 moot. 
12 THE COURT: Would you agree with that, Mr. Carter? 
13 MR. CARTER: I agree with that, yes. 
14 THE COURT: Mr. Wayment? 
15 MR. WAYMENT: Certainly it's true the Division has 
16 turned over a lot of records. Essentially with the exception 
17 of a very small amount of records represented by possibly what 
18 I'm holding here in my left hand, all of the records which 
19 were once in the possession of the Securities Division we now 
20 believe are included in the boxes of evidence at the Utah 
21 County Attorney's Office. That may — it may amount even to, 
22 you know, two or three thousand individual documents. I don't 
23 know. Somewhere between two and four boxes of evidence in that 
24 range. 
25 Nevertheless, it's also true that -- well, especially 
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1 Mr. Stephenson, somebody who's been known to our office for 
2 many years and that we had an independent investigation 
3 especially into Mr. Stephenson going for a long time before our 
4 office determined that there was a parallel investigation going 
5 on with the Securities Division. 
6 So both places did some investigation. Some of 
7 that was provided by the Division. I think that probably the 
8 majority of what we have and certainly the majority of what we 
9 relied on in bringing the case was probably developed by our 
10 office. 
11 I don't know that it makes much difference if the rule 
12 is that we can't — you know, for some reason we can't rely on 
13 stuff from the Securities Division, I think it's undisputable 
14 that we have a lot of stuff from the Securities Division, and 
15 whether it's 49 percent or 51 percent, I don't think there's 
16 any case law or otherwise that would make that the balancing 
17 point for whether we suppress all the evidence or not. 
18 THE COURT: And I guess that's the point with — let 
19 me ask you this, Mr. Esplin. If the State were to stipulate 
20 that for purposes — for all purposes relating to the motion to 
21 suppress, that the granting of the motion to suppress would be 
22 determinative to the case and would prohibit the State from 
23 going forward, would that be sufficient for you to withdraw 
24 your motion to dismiss? 
25 MR. ESPLIN: Yes, I can stipulate to that. 
-8-
THE COURT: Do you so stipulate? 
MR. WAYMENT: Yes. I think it would be impossible for 
the State to prove that the evidence we otherwise developed was 
truly independent. I don't think we could carry that burden, 
and so we couldn't really get past the fruit of the poisonous 
tree argument, and it would be dispositive of the whole case, I 
think. 
THE COURT: Then do you accept that stipulation on 
behalf of — 
MR. CARTER: I do. On behalf of Mr. Stephenson we 
agree. 
THE COURT: All right. Then the motion — do you each 
agree, then, that the motion to dismiss, would you like it 
withdrawn or rendered moot? 
MR. CARTER: I think it's probably determined moot 
based upon — 
MR. ESPLIN: Based on the stipulation. 
THE COURT: Moot based upon the stipulation? 
MR. WAYMENT: That's fine. 
THE COURT: All right, that's the stipulation. That 
will now be the order as to the motion to dismiss. That 
having been disposed of, why don't we turn now to the motion 
to suppress, and we'll hear your arguments there. 
MR. ESPLIN: Perhaps I could address that, your Honor. 
MR. CARTER: And actually, I don't know if the Court 
